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Bruce Kraus and Connor Rasof
A series of D. C. Circuit cases invalidating SEC rules on economic
analysis grounds has cast the agency's rulemaking authority in doubt. We
analyze this case law, noting the incompatibility of strict cost-benefit analysis
procedures designed for executive agencies with the structure and processes of
multimember commissions like the SEC.
The SEC has, until very recently, left courts and commenters free to
develop an ad hoc, open-ended jurisprudence of economics in rulemaking that
has effectively reversed the deference courts have traditionally shown to
agency findings in their area of expertise-in this case, financial economics.
Business Roundtable v. SEC shows how this jurisprudence has proven
increasingly unworkable in practice; and yet, one current legislative proposal
would codify and extend it further. We provide three solutions to this
conundrum.
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Introduction
A twenty-year line of appellate cases' culminating in the D.C. Circuit's
devastating Business Roundtable v. SEC decision2 has set a very high bar for
economic analysis in rulemaking by financial regulators such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). Notwithstanding the Dodd-Frank Act's
express affirmation of the agency's authority,3 the court struck down the SEC's
long-pondered proxy access rule,4 and did so in a way that calls into question
the practical ability of the SEC and other financial regulatory agencies with
statutory economic analysis mandates to adopt future rules that will withstand
challenge. Other financial regulators are alarmed,5 and with good reason, since
their economic analyses of their own rules are generally less sophisticated than
1. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Chamber of
Commerce v. SEC (Chamber II), 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC
(Chamber I), 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Timpinaro v. SEC, 2 F.3d 453 (DC. Cir. 1993).
2. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC,'647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971,
124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010).
4. Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1144.
5. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N,
A REVIEW OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES PERFORMED BY THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMMISSION IN CONNECTION WITH RULEMAKINGS UNDERTAKEN PURSUANT TO THE DODD-FRANK ACT
(2011), available at http://www.cfic.gov/About/CFTCReports/oigjinvestigation_061311 (reviewing the
cost-benefit analysis conducted by the CFTC in its Dodd-Frank rulemakings) [hereinafter CFTC OIG
REPORT]; Arthur Fraas & Randall Lutter, On the Economic Analysis of Regulations at Independent
Regulatory Commissions, 63 ADMIN. L. REv. (SPECIAL EDITION) 213 (2011) (reviewing the cost-benefit




the SEC's.6 Bills introduced in Congress promise to codify these cases and
introduce additional anti-regulatory innovations,7 and to subject independent
agency rules, including the SEC's, to review by the Office of Management and
Budget's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).8 The SEC's
incoming Chair led off her Senate confirmation hearing with a balanced view
of this issue.9
We argue that the SEC should not retreat from economic analysis in
rulemaking but should instead deploy its long-standing expertise in financial
economics to improve both its rulemaking processes and the rules themselves.
In so doing, it should insist on its right, derived from that expertise, to discern
and define the boundary between economic analysis and policy choice, a
distinction to which courts should defer.
The best vehicle for obtaining judicial blessing of the internal reforms it
has already implemented may well be the proxy access rule itself. The SEC
certainly has many other pressing priorities, but a re-proposal of an improved
proxy access rule may be its best hope for the favorable opinion that this area
of law sorely needs and which, we argue, the D.C. Circuit might be inclined to
hand down.
Extending OIRA oversight to independent agencies like the SEC, by
contrast, would erode the agencies' independence from the White House and
invite more critical judicial review. OIRA oversight has a plausible rationale
and bipartisan support but risks becoming a Trojan horse for more Business
Roundtable-style anti-regulatory litigation. Once an agency's economic
analysis has been second-guessed by OIRA, it should not be third-guessed by
the courts. If Congress is to pass such a bill, it should take it as an opportunity
to rebalance the relationship between the agencies and the courts and to remove
existing statutory impediments to pre-decisional deliberations at the
Commissioner level. Without these reforms, multi-member Commissions will
be unable to lawfully carry on an intelligent conversation with the OIRA
6. For an assessment of economic analysis by financial regulators, see U.S. GOv'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 12-151, DODD-FRANK ACT REGULATIONS: IMPLEMENTATION COULD
BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND COORDINATION (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov
/assets/590/5862 1O.pdf.
7. See Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2011, S. 1615, 112th Cong. (2011).
8. Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act, S. 3468, 112th Cong. (2012).
9. See Nominations Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs,
113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Mary Jo White, Nominee, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n),
available at http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfn?FuseAction-Files.View&FileStore id=
619e5603-c2c8-4085-98c6-0014ce29bde7 ("With respect to rulemaking, rigorous economic analysis is
important and should inform and guide the decisions that are made. Although challenging-particularly
in the quantification of benefits-in my view, the SEC should seek to assess, from the outset, the
economic impacts of its contemplated rulemaking. Such transparent and robust analysis, including
consideration of the costs and benefits, will help ensure that effective and optimal solutions are achieved
without unnecessary burdens or competitive harm. If confirmed, I would continue the efforts of the
Commission to ensure that the SEC performs robust analysis in connection with its rules and in a
manner that does not undermine the SEC's ability to carry out its mandate to protect investors and our
capital markets.").
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Administrator, leaving the OIRA process little more than a lightning rod for
harsh judicial review.
In Part I, we review the background of the proxy access case, exploring
possible reasons why the SEC volunteered decades ago for what in retrospect
appears to have been a suicide mission: undertaking cost-benefit analysis
(CBA) of its rules.1o We show that the trend in the case law toward an
affirmative obligation to make economic determinations in the course of
rulemaking antedates the statutes upon which more recent challenges have
increasingly come to rely. Those statutes, adopted in the late 1990s, require the
agency to consider, in addition to the protection of investors, the effects of its
rules on efficiency, competition and capital formation (ECCF) when it adopts
rules in the public interest. Rule challenges under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) based on alleged defects in statutorily-required consideration of
ECCF effects have been 100 percent successful to date;" none of the rules
vacated and remanded for further analysis have ever been re-proposed.
The SEC's approach to economic analysis differs from that of agencies
required to submit their CBA to OIRA. Without the benefits of a dialogue with
OIRA's CBA experts, the SEC until recently left the job of defining the theory
and boundaries of economic analysis under the ECCF statutes to courts and
interested commenters. Abstaining from any construction of its own statute, the
SEC left the D.C. Circuit free to develop an ad hoc, open-ended jurisprudence
of economics in SEC rulemaking that has proven increasingly unworkable in
practice.
We then turn in Part II to Business Roundtable v. SEC,12 devoting
substantial attention to the proposal/comment/adoption process: the first phase
10. For a discussion of cost-benefit analysis, see generally OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-4, at 2-3 (Sept. 17, 2003) [hereinafter OMB
CIRCULAR No. A-4], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/
circulars/a004/a-4.pdf; MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS (2006); STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICious CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 21 (1993); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY
PROTECTION (2002); Michael Abramowicz, Toward a Jurisprudence of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 100
MICH. L. REV. 1708 (2002); E. Donald Elliott, Only a Poor Workman Blames His Tools: On Uses and
Abuses ofBenefit-Cost Analysis in Regulatory Decision Making About the Environment, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 178 (2009); John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 395 (2009); Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving
Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489 (2002); Sally
Katzen, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Where Should We Go from Here?, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1313, 1315-
17 (2006); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 683 (1999); Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1998); Richard H.
Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995); Eric A.
Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537 (2005); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in its Place: Rethinking Regulatory Review, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 335
(2011); and Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651 (2001).
11. See cases cited supra note 1. The CFTC's recent district court victory in Investment Co.
Inst. v. CFTC, CIV.A. 12-00612, 2012 WL 6185735 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2012), is on appeal and could
break the regulators' losing streak. See infra Part V.
12. 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The Business Roundtable opinion has been widely




of the litigation. We examine the Court's harsh criticism of the SEC's treatment
of the empirical economic analysis, in which it quietly substituted a heavy
burden of proof for the deference normally afforded expert findings. We show,
by reference to key economics papers in the record, that this particular criticism
was unfounded. The Court also had additional, valid criticisms of both the rule
and its adopting release, but we show that those can readily be corrected on
remand.
We conclude Part II by observing that the best vehicle for re-establishing
deference for expert agency determinations may well be a new version of the
proxy access rule itself. A Business Roundtable II opinion would give the Court
the opportunity both to commend the agency for learning the lessons it has
been trying to teach and to dial back its apparent substitution of deference to
expert agency judgments with a high burden of proof. A future opinion
upholding a new proxy access rule would serve as a much-needed lodestar for
doing economic analysis in a way that is both feasible and meaningful-not for
the SEC alone, but for other financial regulators with similar requirements.
In Part III, we review reactions to Business Roundtable, beginning in
Congress. Immediately after the decision, congressional Republicans called
agency officials and outside experts in for testimony and initiated inspector
general reviews of rulemaking in a dozen financial regulatory agencies. Soon
thereafter, the agencies' critics introduced the Financial Regulatory
Responsibility Act of 2011 (FRRA). The FRRA would stack the deck against
all new financial regulations by passing them through a maze of exacting
criteria, quantitative analysis, legislative approval, and litigation in which the
Circuit's Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1840 (2012); Jill E. Fisch,
The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable and the Future of SEC Rulemaking, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2164423; Ian D. Ghrist, How To Sufficiently Consider
Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation in the Wake of Business Roundtable, 14
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BuS. L. (forthcoming 2013), http://ssm.com/abstract-2103416; Grant M.
Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Bizarre Law & Economics of Business Roundtable v. SEC, 38 J.
CORP. L. 1 (2012); Michael E. Murphy, The SEC and the District of Columbia Circuit: The Emergency
[sic] of a Distinct Standard of Judicial Review, 7 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 125 (2012); Comment, D.C.
Circuit Finds SEC Proxy Access Rule Arbitrary and Capricious for Inadequate Economic Analysis, 125
HARV. L. REv. 1088 (2012); Anthony W. Mongone, Note, Business Roundtable: A New Level of
Judicial Scrutiny and Its Implications in a Post-Dodd-Frank World, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 746
(2012); Stephanie Lyn Parker, Note, The Folly of Rule 14a-11: Business Roundtable v. SEC and the
Commission's Next Step, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 715 (2012); J. Robert Brown, Jr., Shareholder Access and
Uneconomic Economic Analysis: Business Roundtable v. SEC, DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE (Sept. 30,
2011, 2:57 PM), http://www.denverlawreview.org/online-articles/2011/9/30/shareholder-access-and-
uneconomic-economic-analysis-business.html; DENNIS KELLEHER, STEPHEN HALL & KATELYNN
BRADLEY, BETTER MARKETS, INC., SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND
FINANCIAL REFORM AT THE SEC 59-68 (2012), http://www.bettermarkets.com/sites/default/files/
Setting%20The%2ORecord%2OStraight.pdf [hereinafter BETTER MARKETS]. The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce sponsored a white paper in response. See PAUL ROSE & CHRISTOPHER WALKER, U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE CENTER FOR CAPITAL MARKETS COMPETITIVENESS, THE IMPORTANCE OF
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN FINANCIAL REGULATION (2013), available at http://www.uschamber.com/
sites/default/files/reports/CBA-Report-3.10.13.pdf [hereinafter CHAMBER WHITE PAPER]. We contrast
our policy prescriptions with those of other commentators in Part V, infra.
13. Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2011, S. 1615, 112th Cong. (2011).
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agency would bear a "clear and convincing" burden of proof'14 We show that
the FRRA, extreme as it may seem at first blush, is little more than a logical
extension of the Business Roundtable case, the culmination of a trend
empowering courts to strike down regulations almost at will.
Part IV discusses the SEC's response to the Business Roundtable decision.
We examine the agency's attempt to square the difficult case law that led to the
Business Roundtable decision with settled principles of administrative law,
regulatory analysis, and microeconomic theory. We examine the longstanding
role of financial economists at the SEC, a distinguished and growing cadre now
housed in its three-year-old Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial
Innovation (RSFI). We assess the new guidance that RSFI and the SEC Office
of General Counsel (OGC) recently posted for economic analysis (2012
Guidance), which consolidated procedural reforms set in motion long before
the Business Roundtable decision.'5 We conclude by noting that while the 2012
Guidance is a positive step, it should be refined and elaborated based on
experience to draw rational boundaries around the "consideration" that the
ECCF statutes require, and thereby make ECCF analysis both valuable and
feasible. To enhance the degree of deference courts afford this line-drawing
exercise, the Commission itself should adopt a future iteration of the 2012
Guidance as a policy statement. Such a statement should reflect the best
practices that emerge from this effort, after notice and comment from the public
would help courts reset the bar on judicial review of subsequent regulations to
an attainable height. The SEC must set rational boundaries around the scope of
its own economic analyses, boundaries within which data analysis and
economic theory can inform, but not dictate, policy outcomes. 16
Part V argues that multi-member commissions cannot be expected to act
with the same degree of rationality and coherence as hierarchical bureaucracies.
These quasi-legislative bodies engage in log-rolling to reach agreement that
often does not map well onto cost-benefit analysis. This problem is exacerbated
by the Sunshine Act, which prohibits agency leaders from engaging in private
14. See infra notes 169-178 and accompanying text.
15. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, CURRENT GUIDANCE ON EcoNoMIC ANALYSIS IN SEC
RULEMAKINGS (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi guidanceeconanaly
secrulemaking.pdf [hereinafter 2012 Guidance].
16. Since Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984), judicial deference to agency interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions has been a central
tenet of the administrative state. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron
Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts, and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power To Say What the
Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2850, 2850 (2006) ("Chevron is not merely a counter-Marbury for the executive
branch, but also the Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins of the last half-century."); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron
Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190 (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero] ("Chevron might
well be seen not only as a kind of counter-Marbury, but even more fundamentally as the administrative
state's very own McCulloch v. Maryland, permitting agencies to do as they wish so long as there is a




deliberation. 17 To illuminate this issue, we discuss a bill that would authorize
the President to subject independent agencies, and their economic analysis of
regulations, to OIRA review. Economic analysis should be a conversation, not
a simple calculation or a confrontation. Conversations between the agency and
OIRA could improve SEC rules, but only if Commissioners are legally
permitted to have conversations among themselves before conversing with
OIRA. Such a state of affairs would be far preferable to the SEC's failed
twenty-year dialogue with the D.C. Circuit. We therefore recommend that any
bill permitting OIRA review of independent agency economic analyses also
preclude judicial review of such analyses.
I. Statutory, Administrative and Case Law Background
The SEC, like other independent agencies, has always been exempt from
the cost-benefit analysis process mandated by Executive Order 12,866 and its
predecessors. Agencies subject to EO 12,866 routinely quantify the costs and
benefits of their proposed rules (often with the help of outside consultants) in
analyses they submit to OIRA.19 While the OIRA process has not been without
its critics, this dialogue affords the Executive Office of the President (and, in
some high-profile instances, White House staff), other agencies, parties
affected by the proposed regulations, and the public an important opportunity to
influence agency regulations. 20 The cost-benefit analysis acknowledges and
17. Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1231 (1976) (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 552b) (hereinafter Sunshine Act].
18. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993) (exempting "independent regulatory
agencies" as defined by the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-21 (2006), from the OIRA
review process). A number of scholars and practitioners have advocated subjecting independent
agencies to regulatory review. See, e.g., Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 10. See infra Part III for a
discussion of proposed legislation that would subject the independent agencies to additional procedural
hurdles, including OIRA review.
19. 3 C.F.R. § 639 (1993) ("Each agency shall assess both the costs and the benefits of the
intended regulation and, recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or
adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify
its costs."). For an overview of the effects of OIRA review on agency procedures, including their use of
outside consultants, see Michael A. Livermore, Cause or Cure? Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory
Gridlock, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 107 (2008) [hereinafter Livermore, Cause or Cure?]; and Michael A.
Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with authors). See also Paul R. Verkuil, The Wait Is Over: Chevron as the Stealth Vermont Yankee II,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 921, 928 (2007) ("Agency officials, overwhelmed . . . are increasingly
delegating .. . to private contractors and signing off on the results.").
20. A substantial literature has analyzed the OIRA process. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley &
Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLuM. L. REV. 1260 (2006);
James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: An Overview and
Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 851 (2001); Steven Croley, White House Review of
Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 872 (2003); Christopher C.
DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075
(1986); E. Donald Elliott, TQM-ing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 12,291
Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do About It, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167
(1994); Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way To Write a
Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1986).
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seeks to quantify the trade-offs involved, and ideally rationally frames the
policy debate, offering common ground as a starting point for both proponents
and detractors of the rule to comment. For clarity, we will refer to these
processes and procedures as "OIRA CBA." OIRA CBA is, by its terms, exempt
from judicial review21 and courts appear to have rarely looked to it when
judging other aspects of a proposed rule.22 It is undisputed that the SEC is not
required to perform OIRA CBA. But in the 1970s, it began to include cost-
benefit sections in its releases anyway. That decision--eventually codified by
Congress and ultimately aggressively enforced by the courts-laid the
groundwork for Business Roundtable.
A. Volunteering for a Suicide Mission?
In the 1970s, shortly before EO 12,866's key predecessor was
promulgated,23 the SEC voluntarily began to include in its proposing releases
and adopting releases24 a section entitled "Cost-Benefit Analysis." We refer to
this voluntary discussion of benefits and costs as "SEC CBA." SEC CBA was
never submitted to OIRA, although it was subject to public comment in the
rulemaking process and, as we shall see, to judicial review. In 1996, the
Congressional Review Act (CRA)25 required submission of some of the
information in the SEC CBA to the General Accounting Office (later named the
Government Accountability Office) and then to Congress.26
The SEC's motivation for including SEC CBA in its releases back in the
1970s, when no statute or executive order required it, may have been a strategic
21. 3 C.F.R. § 649 (1993) ('This Executive order is intended only to improve the internal
management of the Federal Government and does not create any right or benefit, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its agencies or
instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person."). See infra Parts III & V for a
discussion of proposed legislation that would effectively reverse this rule.
22. But see Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1552 (suggesting that courts review OIRA
CBA "to the extent those analyses are relevant to the legality of the agency's conduct"). When Courts
review compliance with statutes such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12 (2006), they
incidentally review elements of OIRA CBA if the agency has cross-referenced them to fulfill those
statutory requirements.
23. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981) (providing a process for OIRA review of
rules relatively similar to Executive Order 12,866, but subjecting most rules rather than only
"significant" rules to review).
24. Documents that, if issued by other agencies, would typically be called "proposed rules"
and "final rules," respectively.
25. Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-08 (2006).
26. Id. § 804. Agencies must also submit rules to OIRA for designation as either "major" or
"minor" rules. This determination is much narrower than the Executive Order 12,866 review process.
Though the CRA nominally allows Congress to overturn rules issued by independent agencies, Congress
has never successfully used the CRA procedures to overturn a rule and appears to have generally
ignored CRA submissions. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 06-601T, PERSPECTIVES ON
10 YEARS OF CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2006) (noting that from 1996 to 2006,
members of Congress introduced only thirty-seven CRA disapproval resolutions, and only one was
approved). To provide context, agencies issued approximately 40,000 rules during this period. See
STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 109 (2008).
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one with respect to the White House. In the early years of OIRA review, the
White House and observers considered both the propriety and legality of
including independent agencies within the scope of the executive order
mandating such review.27 President Reagan's Executive Order wound up
exempting the independent agencies, but then-Vice President Bush followed up
with a letter asking them to comply as though the Order applied to them.28
It may have seemed prudent at the time for the SEC to begin including a
(largely redundant) section entitled Cost-Benefit Analysis in releases; as long
as SEC CBA was not subject to OIRA review and approval, it would have
seemed that it could do little harm.29 The optics of such a section may have
been thought to appease the SEC's congressional overseers as well, which it
seemed to do when those sections were not being read with a critical eye.
Whatever the original rationale, once the practice had begun, those overseers
naturally asked subsequent SEC Chairs whether they would continue SEC
CBA. That question had only one right answer, however redundant SEC CBA
may have been.
SEC CBA would ideally have been a means for the SEC staff to inform
the Commissioners of the costs and the benefits of various policy options under
consideration. However, SEC CBA generally only repeated policy arguments
made elsewhere in the release, and supplied no additional information or
analysis. SEC CBA did not quantify expected benefits, and its quantified costs
were typically limited to a subset of the direct compliance burden, estimated for
an entirely different purpose: a mandate under the Paperwork Reduction Act
(PRA).30
Of course, important trade-offs identified in SEC CBA should, and
probably did, at times, influence the policy statements made in the preamble.
Repeated admonitions to the SEC to involve staff economists earlier in the
rulemaking process suggest, however, that the advice of those economists may
often have been sought too late in the process to influence policy.3 1 Still, even
27. For a sense of this debate over time, see Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 10.
28. For this history, see BARRY D. FRIEDMAN, REGULATION IN THE REAGAN-BUSH ERA: THE
ERUPTION OF PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE 78 (1995); Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 15 (stating that
"not one" of the independent agencies that were asked voluntarily to comply "formally acknowledged
their willingness do to so"); and Peter L. Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 592-93 (1984).
29. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES IN SELECTED SEC DODD-FRANK ACT RULEMAKINGS 12 (2012), available at
http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/Auditslnspections/2012/499.pdf [hereinafter KYLE REPORT]
("[A]lthough the SEC, an independent regulatory agency, is not expressly required to conduct cost-
benefit analyses, SEC Chairmen have made a commitment to Congress that the Commission will
conduct cost-benefit or economic analyses for its rulemakings.").
30. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-21 (2006) (requiring disclosure of the estimated time necessary to
comply with information collection requests such as filling out forms; the burden-hours created by these
forms were typically multiplied by wage data supplied by a securities industry trade association to
calculate the PRA numbers, which were typically also referenced in SEC CBA).
31. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, RULEMAKING
PROCESS (2002), http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/Auditslnspections/2002/347fin.htm. For the most
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if economic thinking and the work of the SEC's staff of professional
economists did influence policy from time to time before judicial review began,
SEC CBA contained scant evidence of it. As a result, SEC CBA for many years
was treated as a procedural requirement, similar to the Regulatory Flexibility
Act3 rather than a policy exercise.
In 1996, the National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA), part
of Newt Gingrich's "Contract With America," amended the securities laws to
require that the SEC consider the impact of its rules on "efficiency, competition
and capital formation" (ECCF). But after passage of NSMIA, the SEC added
a new section to its releases, containing what we will refer to as "ECCF
consideration." In many proposing releases, the entire ECCF consideration
section was no more than an invitation to comment on the proposal's effects on
efficiency, competition and capital formation, terms that to this day the
Commission has never defined. SEC responses to these comments in the
adopting releases were generally perfunctory.
B. Timpinaro: Professional Traders
SEC CBA began in the 1970s, but it was only in 1993 that the D.C.
Circuit first reviewed it in a little-known case which presaged the jurisprudence
that emerged from the ECCF statutes adopted later in the decade. Timpinaro v.
SEC34 involved NASDAQ's Short Order Execution System (SOES), which was
"designed to provide the benefits of automatic execution to retail customer
orders of limited size for securities quoted on the [NASDAQ] System." 35 At
issue was a challenge brought by securities broker-dealers to a SEC rule
prohibiting professional traders from making clever use of the SOES to earn
riskless trading profits by exploiting a price disparity among different market
recent example at the time of this writing, see id. at vii ("SEC rulewriting divisions and RiskFin should
consider ways for economists to provide additional input into cost-benefit analyses of SEC rulemakings
to assist in including both quantitative and qualitative information to the extent possible.").
32. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12; see also Nat'l Tel. Co-op. Ass'n v. FCC, 563 F.3d 536, 540 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (noting that the Regulatory Flexibility Act is "purely procedural" and "imposes no substantive
constraints on agency decisionmaking"). This section includes amendments made in the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA), Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (1996), codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. According to a report of the CFTC's Inspector General, the
corresponding sections of that agency's releases were colorfully referred to internally as the "caboose"
of the release. CFTC OIG REPORT, supra note 5, at 16. That report, which inspired the flurry of
Congressionally-instigated IG reports discussed infra note 162, views the term as indicative of the
CFTC's dismissive attitude towards its own statutory economic analysis requirements.
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(f), 80a-2(c) (2006) (requiring that whenever "the Commission is
engaged in rulemaking" it consider "whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation").
34. 2 F.3d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Timpinaro is not cited in the more recent cases discussed
below, several of which were also written by Judge Ginsburg.
35. Id. at 455 (quoting Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Related to the Small Order Execution System,




makers in order to earn an arbitrage profit (the SEC termed this "picking off'
the market makers).
In Timpinaro, Judge Douglas Ginsburg, himself a former OIRA
Administrator and Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division, began
by commending the SEC for proceeding in its analysis from a "sound theory of
market behavior."36  The "theory" in question was simply the SEC's
observation that in the absence of an SOES access rule protecting them from
being "picked off" by professional traders, some market makers would cease
making markets in certain stocks. The SEC presumed that this reduced
competition among market makers would widen spreads and impair market
liquidity.
The D.C. Circuit nonetheless remanded the rule, calling upon the SEC to
produce evidence of the withdrawals from market making that its theory
predicted, and to balance the value of avoiding wider spreads and reduced
liquidity against the lost "benefit" of the professional traders' activities, namely
the improvements in efficiency in market pricing that would presumably result
from market makers' increased vigilance and more frequent updates of
quotations, to mitigate the effectiveness of the professional traders' tactics.3 7
Citing a regression analysis by the National Association of Securities
Dealers Department of Economic Research on the relationship between SOES
activity and spreads as evidence of the apparent feasibility of the approach he
required, Judge Ginsburg, noting that the SEC had not performed a regression
analysis on its own, concluded that the SEC had not adequately substantiated
its reasoning and remanded the rule for further analysis of its benefits and
costs.38 The SEC never promulgated a final version of the rule.
Timpinaro in retrospect appears as an unheeded wake-up call. Three years
before Congress mandated consideration of ECCF factors, this case illustrates
the tension between the protection of investors and the promotion of market
pricing efficiency. SOES was designed to give small investors special access to
the automatic execution, and the rules at issue were like the squirrel guard on a
bird feeder, designed to prevent another species from appropriating the
intended benefit. The reasoning in Timpinaro ignores this dynamic, making the
rule stand or fall on the basis of an empirical, quantitative comparison of two
countervailing effects that theory predicts would affect market pricing
efficiency. Thus, a passing, unexceptional observation about the first- and
second-order economic effects of the rule was elevated above the concerns for
36. Id. at 457.
37. Id. at 457-58.
38. Id. at 458 ("We cannot say whether such a study could or should have been conducted
before the Professional Trader Rule was adopted, but the apparent feasibility of such a study reinforces
our conviction that the SEC has not adequately substantiated its implicit claim that the effect of
'professional SOES trading' upon bid-ask spreads outweighs the beneficial effect of more timely pricing
by market makers. We therefore remand this aspect of the case for the Commission to address the
balance of benefits and costs associated with the Professional Trader Rule.").
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fairness to small investors and market makers that drove the rule in the first
place. This aspect of the opinion anticipated not only the strong interpretations
of the ECCF statutes that were soon to come, 39 but also the stringent terms of
the FRRA, pending in Congress at the time of this writing.40
C. ECCF Statutes Enacted
In the late 1990s, in the wake of Newt Gingrich's "Contract with
America," Congress added the requirement to consider "efficiency,
competition, and capital formation" to the Securities Act,4 1 the Exchange Act, 42
the Investment Company Act, 43 and the Investment Advisors Act." The ECCF
amendments explicitly reiterated the Commission's primary mission, "the
protection of investors," and applied the new criteria only where the Securities
Laws already contemplated rulemaking "in the public interest." 45 What,
exactly, did the ECCF require the agency to consider?
Congress did not define the terms "efficiency," "competition," or "capital
formation." 46 "Efficiency" has a plain and ordinary meaning: doing more with
less.47 Efficiency is also a fundamental concept in economic theory, which
48
posits that efficient markets produce a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources.
Pareto optimality under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion (also known as "weak
Pareto efficiency") is the basis for most quantitative public policy analysis,
including OIRA CBA. 49 Kaldor-Hicks assumes distributive effects are evened
out somehow (or ignored) and focuses on net aggregate societal benefits
instead.
However, all three ECCF factors are rightly viewed as aspects of
efficiency. Economic efficiency (and inefficiency) are attributes of markets.
Markets cannot be understood or assessed from an economic point of view
without an understanding of the competitive forces at play, including barriers to
new competition, making consideration of competition part and parcel of any
39. See infra Section I.C.
40. See infra Section III.B.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006).
42. Id. § 78c(f).
43. Id. § 80a-2(c).
44. Id § 80b-2(c).
45. Id.
46. For a discussion of the legislative history of the ECCF amendments, see Cox & Baucom,
supra note 12, at 1818-24.
47. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 397 ( Ith ed., 2003) (defining
efficient as "productive of desired effects; esp.: productive without waste.").
48. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 350, 549 (1995).
49. See Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and Comment on
Conference Papers, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVEs 317-18 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001) (explaining that in a particular
sense, "cost-benefit analysis" simply denotes the "Kaldor-Hicks . . . concept of efficiency."). For
discussion of whether Kaldor-Hicks is an appropriate standard for agencies engaging in cost-benefit




discussion of the efficiency of markets. Under such a framework, capital
formation becomes simply one aspect of allocative efficiency: not an estimate
of a gross amount, but a measure of the extent to which the right amount of
capital is being raised from the right investors and flowing to the right
investments, at the right risk-adjusted returns.
Back in the 1990s, the SEC could perhaps have complied with the ECCF
amendments by bringing SEC CBA more in line with OIRA CBA's focus on
economic efficiency. Instead, SEC releases continued to include old-fashioned
SEC CBA, and a new ECCF consideration section began to appear at the end of
SEC releases, separated from SEC CBA by several other technical sections.o
The ECCF consideration section rarely contained any new information; in fact,
in many proposing releases it was no more than an invitation for public
comment on "efficiency, competition and capital formation."5 I These terms
remained undefined. As a result, the corresponding section in the Adopting
52Release was nothing more than a response to commenters. Ironically, the SEC
continued to devote greater effort and attention to the voluntary SEC CBA,
while giving short shrift to the statutory ECCF consideration section, the
section under which its economic analysis would ultimately be challenged. The
SEC in effect handed over to the regulated entities (and other commenters) its
prerogative to define the terms of its own statute, accepting whatever it was that
the commenter du jour thought the terms meant. At the time, this may have
seemed like the path of least resistance; the ensuing case law reveals where that
path led.
D. Chamber I & Chamber II: Mutual Fund Boards
In 2004, the SEC, responding to concerns about conflicts of interest in the
management of mutual funds, adopted a rule requiring that mutual fund boards
be chaired by a director independent of the fund's investment advisor and that
75 percent of the board should be independent.53 The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce petitioned the D.C. Circuit to overturn the rule, primarily on
statutory authority grounds, a claim Judge Ginsburg, writing once again for the
50. See, e.g., OTC Derivatives Dealers, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,362 (Nov. 3, 1998) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 200, 240, 249).
51. See, e.g., Registration under the Securities Act of 1933 of Certain Investment Company
Securities, 62 Fed. Reg. 47,934, 47,937 (Sept. 12, 1997) (codified at scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.)
(merely noting at the end ofthe cost-benefit analysis that "[i]n addition, the amendments should have no
adverse effects on efficiency, competition, or capital formation.").
52. This was in part because case law interpreting the APA's notice and comment
requirements generally prohibits agencies from otherwise presenting new facts or arguments for the first
time in the adopting release because they would otherwise be insulated from public comment. See, e.g.,
Chamber II, 443 F.3d at 900 ("[I]f the agency determines that additional fact gathering is necessary,
then notice and comment are typically required.").
53. For an overview of the history and important insights, see Edward Sherwin, The Cost-
Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Lessons from the SEC's Stalled Mutual Fund Reform Effort,
12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2006).
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Court, rejected.54 The Court likewise rejected most of the Chamber's ECCF
contentions, noting "the extreme degree of deference" owed to an agency
"when it is evaluating scientific data within its technical expertise."55
Moreover, the Court found it proper for the Commission to reach conclusions
based on its own and its staff's experience, rather than commissioning a study
on the effect of an independent chairman on fund performance.56 Backing off
from his suggestion in Timpinaro that the SEC might be required to run its own
empirical regression analyses to test the theoretical costs and benefits of a rule
simply because it can,57 Judge Ginsburg wrote that that the Court was "acutely
aware that an agency need not-indeed cannot-base its every action upon
empirical data; depending upon the nature of the problem, an agency may be
'entitled to conduct .. . a general analysis based on informed conjecture.'
The rule fell nonetheless. The Court found that the SEC's failure to assess
one relatively minor cost violated its obligation to consider ECCF factors, and
the rule was therefore set aside under the APA.59 Specifically, the release had
acknowledged that an independent chairman might require more staff, but
confessed that the SEC "had no reliable basis for estimating those costs," 60 also
noting that it had offered companies three different ways to satisfy the
requirement. The agency therefore expressly declined to make cost estimates
for the 75 percent independent director condition. In effect, the SEC had
concluded that it was not worth the effort to calculate the costs of compliance
because those costs would be so minor. The SEC's conclusion displeased the
Court, which held: "[I]n [the] face of uncertainty, [an] agency must 'exercise its
expertise to make tough choices about which of the competing estimates is
most plausible, and to hazard a guess as to which is correct, even if . . . the
estimate will be imprecise."' 61  Chamber I thus interpreted the ECCF
consideration to require the agency to make quantitative determinations.62
54. Chamber l, 412 F.3d at 136.
55. Id. at 143 (quoting Huls Am. Inc. v. Browner, 83 F.3d 445, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); see also
Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review: Talking Points, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 350, 352 (1996) ("[Q]uestions
have been raised about whether we in the courts are competent to review the minutiae of risk or cost-
benefit analysis. For most of us, the answer is no.").
56. Chamber I, 412 F.3d at 142.
57. See Timpinaro, 2 F.3d at 457-58.
58. Chamber I, 412 F.3d at 142 (quoting Melcher v. FCC, 134 F.3d 1143, 1158 (D.C. Cir.
1998)). As we will see, this liberality was short lived. See infra notes 79-141 and accompanying text.
59. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) ("[T]he reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be-(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .") (emphasis added). For an overview of the structure and
history of the APA, see Edward Rubin, It's Time To Make the Administrative Procedure Act
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 95 (2003).
60. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,387 n.81 (Aug. 2, 2004)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270.)
61. Chamber I, 412 F.3d at 143 (quoting Pub. Citizen v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin.,
374 F.3d 1209, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
62. The remand was based on one additional ground: failure to consider an alternative




The Chamber I court drew its key language from the Public Citizen
case,63 which involved a significantly stricter statutory requirement. The
authorizing statute in that case directed the Federal Highway Administration to
issue a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) addressing the problem of truck
driver fatigue. The NPRM was required by law to at least consider requiring
truck drivers to install "automated and tamper-proof recording devices."" The
FHA declined to consider that requirement, citing the difficulty of
assessment-a rationale the Court understandably rejected.65 Holding otherwise
would have made the Court complicit in nullification by the executive branch
of a specific congressional directive. 6
But there is a world of difference between a statute instructing an agency
to consider "efficiency" and a statute instructing an agency to consider a
particular solution to a particular problem. When a statute instructs an agency
to "consider" something as broad as "efficiency," and the agency considers
many aspects of efficiency and declines to address others, a reviewing court
should hesitate to void the resulting rule. The extent to which the agency
"considers" ECCF factors is a matter of judgment--one that can and should
vary significantly depending upon the rule and its context. No matter how
much analysis the SEC undertakes, a court can always point to an additional
issue that should have been analyzed, or analyzed differently or more deeply.
Pressed for time because of the imminent departure of Chairman
Donaldson and the fact that incoming Chairman Cox was likely to oppose the
rule on policy grounds, the SEC developed the cost estimates required by
Chamber I in a matter of days. The court again remanded the rule, this time on
the ground that the new data used to estimate the costs had not been placed on
the record for public comment. 7 In effect, the court ruled that the absence of
notice and the opportunity to comment on the going rate for professional staff
had prejudiced the Chamber. The SEC lost Chamber I for failing to quantify,
and lost Chamber II for not subjecting its quantitative data to the notice and
comment process. Following Chamber II, the SEC dutifully opened a comment
file, through which it received overwhelming confirmation that it had been
that had been endorsed by two dissenting Commissioners. See id. at 144 ("Finally, the Chamber argues
the Commission gave 'inadequate consideration' to suggested alternatives to the independent chairman
condition, citing as an example-the only significant one, it seems to us-the proposal, endorsed by the
two dissenting Commissioners, that each fund be required prominently to disclose whether it has an
inside or an independent chairman and thereby allow investors to make an informed choice." (emphasis
added)).
63. Pub. Citizen v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 374 F.3d 1209, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
64. Id. at 1221.
65. Id. at 1211.
66. For a description of strategic interaction between the branches, see William Eskridge, Jr. &
John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992).
67. Chamber II, 443 F.3d at 894.
68. Id. ("[Tihe Commission failed to comply with section 553(c) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §
553(c), by relying on materials not in the rulemaking record without affording an opportunity for public
comment, to the prejudice of the Chamber.").
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right all along: the costs involved were slim to none.69 Nonetheless, Chairman
Cox and his colleagues did not re-propose the independent chairman rule and it
has not been enacted as of this writing. Its moment had passed.
The remand notwithstanding, the Chamber I case evinced considerable
deference to the SEC's expertise, offering considerable leeway for judgments,
forecasts, "informed conjecture" and predictions based on the expert
knowledge of the agency. This deference stands in stark contrast to the
Business Roundtable case, which would later deride a Commission observation
as "unutterably mindless."70
Still, three aspects of Chamber I sowed seeds of future troubles. First, the
court emphasized the alternative proposed by two dissenting Commissioners
and the SEC CBA's failure to address this alternative.71 This discussion sent a
message to future commissioners about the power of their statements at open
meetings, particularly statements in dissent. This message was particularly
important given the widely acknowledged increase in partisan polarization in
Washington in recent years. 72 The Exchange Act gives the President the power
to fill a majority of seats on the Commission with members of his or her own
party, but Chamber I (and, as we shall see, Business Roundtable as well)
effectively gives an outvoted member the right to subject the rule to a more
exacting standard of review. Statements by dissenting commissioners at the
SEC open meeting approving the rule often trigger heightened judicial scrutiny
of the rule provisions criticized in the dissenting statement. And these
statements come too late in the adoption process to be addressed or rebutted by
either the majority or the staff.
Second, Chamber I held that the SEC did not have the right to decide
which costs were worth quantifying and which were not. Because it required
the SEC, on the eve of the Chairman's departure, to hazard a guess about a
matter the SEC deemed trivial and unlikely to affect the outcome, the rule died
on remand, even though, as Murphy shows, 7 3 the re-opened comment file
demonstrates that the SEC's conjecture that the direct costs of independent
directors are trivial was confirmed. This outcome is a counterexample to
observers who believe that policies based on sound empirics will survive
69. See Murphy, supra note 12, at 139-140.
70. Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1156.
71. See Chamber !, 412 F.3d at 144 ("We conclude the Commission's failure to consider the
disclosure alternative violated the APA. To be sure, the Commission is not required to consider [every
alternative] .... Here, however, two dissenting Commissioners raised, as an alternative to prescription,
reliance upon disclosure. . . ." (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
72. For an overview of research on polarization of political elites, see Mark J. Hetherington,
Putting Polarization in Perspective, 39 BRr. J. POL. SC. 413, 413 (2009) ("Scholarly research has
demonstrated rather conclusively that American political elites have undergone a marked partisan
polarization over the past thirty years.").




agency regime change. 74 We assume no bad faith or blind partisanship, only
that new management will naturally have priorities and agendas of its own,
which will necessarily preoccupy them during their brief turn at the helm. As
we elaborate in Parts III and IV, the SEC is in a far better position than the
courts, based on its intimate knowledge of the financial markets and their
problems-and of its own data resources and analytic capabilities-to identify
the point of diminishing returns to further economic analysis, and to set rational
boundaries around the exercise of that analysis. Without judicial deference to
this key determination, any and all SEC regulations will face the threat of
remand to consider just one additional factor.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, Chamber I subtly elevated the
statutory mandate for the SEC to "consider" efficiency, competition and capital
formation to and an independent obligation to determine (as best it can) the
economic consequences of proposed rules. 5 The SEC could and should have
interpreted the ECCF provisions as a purely procedural requirement, like the
strictures of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. 76 Under this interpretation, the SEC
would have satisfied its obligation merely by making a reasonable effort to
address each of the required ECCF elements. As we discuss in greater detail
below, such an SEC interpretation would be entitled to deferencen7 but the SEC
has never expressly interpreted the ECCF amendments.
Surprisingly, the specific "economic consequences" the Court required the
SEC to chase down were not big-picture micro- or macroeconomic
considerations, but minor particular costs. The focus on minor cost estimates
reinforced the SEC's unfortunate, long-standing tendency to base the cost
analysis in SEC CBA on hourly burden estimates provided for Paperwork
Reduction Act purposes. Repetition of PRA estimates (multiplied by standard
wage rates) adds no useful information to the release, and obscures what should
be the real focus: the full range of social costs and benefits of a proposed
action. Instead of building a top-down overview of the rule's effects from an
economic standpoint, delineating the anticipated first- and second-order effects
of the proposed rule, SEC CBA often appears to be built from the bottom up,
74. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE
CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 86 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012).
75. Chamber I, 412 F.3d at 143.
76. For a more complete discussion, see Murphy, supra note 12, at 129-30.
77. For a description of different deference regimes, see Connor Raso & William N. Eskridge
Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency
Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1727 (2010). In recent years, a debate has emerged as to whether
independent agencies should receive less deference because they are insulated from presidential control.
See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 547 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that
an independent "agency's comparative freedom from ballot-box control makes it all the more important
that courts review its decisionmaking to assure compliance with applicable provisions of the law");
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2245, 2376-77 (2001) (proposing to
increase deference when the president has been more closely involved with the agency decision at issue
and therefore "giving greater deference to executive than to independent agencies").
78. Chamber I, 412 F.3d at 143.
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based primarily on PRA costs and frequency estimates. Even in releases with
good economics in them, like the Proxy Access Adopting Release, the
inclusion of PRA numbers in the SEC CBA gave the rule's opponents an
opening to emphasize the paperwork burden imposed by the rule and ignore the
much larger ebenefits (and costs).
Under Chairman Cox, the SEC made no public statements about the
Chamber cases. Nor did it publish any new rulemaking guidance or issue a
formal interpretation of the ECCF consideration provision. Those cases may,
however, explain the remarkable increase in length of the SEC CBA and ECCF
consideration sections of SEC releases following these decisions. The
economic analysis in SEC releases began to include more surveys of available
empirical economic evidence, particularly in releases for controversial rules. In
its propounding and evaluating of economic theories, and its reviews and
evaluations of econometric literature, the SEC called on its staff economists in
what was then called the Office of Economic Analysis to produce work that
was substantially more sophisticated than the corresponding sections of
releases from other financial regulatory agencies with similar statutory
mandates.
E. American Equity: Fixed Index Annuities
In 2009, the SEC decided that fixed indexed annuities (FIAs) issued by
state-regulated insurance companies should be regulated as securities if the
component of the investment tied to stock market indices dominated the
annuity component backed by the insurance company's balance sheet.so That
determination would require sellers of such products to register as broker
dealers. An insurance company engaged in the sale of FIAs, American Equity
Investment Life Insurance Company, petitioned the D.C. Circuit to invalidate
the rule, primarily on the ground that the SEC lacked authority to issue the rule.
The Court accorded Chevron deference to the agency's interpretation of the
statutory term "annuity" and so, as in Chamber I, the agency prevailed on the
challenge to its statutory authority.8' But the ECCF challenge again prevailed.
A make-weight argument that neither party appears to have taken seriously was
now well on its way to becoming a very potent doctrine indeed.82
79. For examples and a discussion of such efforts, see U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO 12-15 1, DODD-FRANK ACT REGULATIONS: IMPLEMENTATION COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL
ANALYSES AND COORDINATION (2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/586210.pdf.
80. Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts, 74 Fed. Reg. 3138 (Jan. 16,
2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240).
81. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 173-74 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
82. A subsequent case, NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 2010), could easily be
added to the list of ECCF cases. In that case, the Court invalidated the SEC's approval of fees charged
by an exchange for data because the SEC had not presented evidence to support its view that similar data




Chief Judge Sentelle, writing for a D.C. Circuit panel that included Judge
Ginsburg, remanded the indexed annuity rule, faulting the SEC's competition
analysis for failing to determine baseline levels of competition and efficiency
under the preexisting state law regime-in other words, failing to find whether
state law contained sufficient protections for investors to make informed
decisions and sellers to make suitable recommendations. In this, the court
may have been alluding to, and pressing the SEC to adopt more generally, one
of the fundamental requirements of OIRA CBA: specifying a baseline.
Agencies conducting OIRA CBA then compare the current state of affairs
absent the rule with the state of affairs anticipated following the adoption of the
rule.8
We agree that, even where quantification is not feasible, consideration of
ECCF should begin with an assessment of whether the market is already
competitive or concentrated, efficient or inefficient. The 2012 Guidelines,
discussed below, adopt this general rule. Like other elements of economic
analysis, however, this requirement can be extended to the point where the
burden of execution is unreasonable and in some cases infeasible." An antitrust
analysis of competition and of the "baseline level of price transparency and
information disclosure under state law"86 in a single market is no small task,
and a 50-state survey would impose correspondingly greater burdens.
Similarly, the requirement to analyze whether sufficient protections existed in
any of the states "to enable investors to make informed investment decisions
and sellers to make suitable recommendations to investors"87 taxed the
agency's resources, and contributed to its failure to respond quickly.
Before the SEC could promulgate a new rule containing the required
analysis, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which stripped the SEC of
authority to regulate FIAs, mooting the issue.88 The D.C. Circuit Court never
saw the extensive SEC staff work on the remand, which could have contributed
to an incorrect but understandable assumption on Judge Ginsburg's part that the
83. American Equity, 613 F.3d at 167-68.
84. OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-4, supra note 10, at 2-3.
85. For an extensive and thoughtful discussion of this problem in the environmental context,
see Wendy Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321,
1393-94 n.274 (2010) ("[V]irtually all of the information and analysis requirements are imposed on
agencies without protecting them from candid disclosures or litigation-generating admissions against
interest. These added analyses are often prepared near the end of the process, when the decision is close
to final. As a result, the reports serve in practice only to increase the agency's vulnerability to lawsuits
and unwelcome political pressure if the agency slips and includes, in writing, some admissions against
interest. Not surprisingly, agency general counsel and other high level officials appear to play a heavy
hand in the drafting of the document, just as they do for proposed and final rules, and sometimes limit
the analysis, potentially substantially.").
86. American Equity, 613 F.3d at 178.
87. Id. at 179.
88. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
989, 124 Stat. 1376, 1949-50 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77c)).
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SEC simply was not listening-a misimpression which in turn could have
influenced the tone of the Business Roundtable decision.
II. Business Roundtable: The Proxy Access Rule
A. Proxy Access: A Policy Considered For 60 Years
The question whether company proxy materials must include shareholder
nominee proposals, and whether federal proxy rules that fail to do so frustrate
stockholder rights under state law, has been debated since the establishment of
federal regulation of the proxy process in 1934.89 Regulations issued under the
Exchange Act reserved the issuer's proxy materials for the solicitation of votes
in favor of the slate of directors proposed by incumbent management, requiring
challengers to provide proxy materials of their own.90 No single ballot listed all
candidates; instead, shareholders were urged in separate mailings to sign and
return either one proxy card or the other.91 Modem electronic proxies work
similarly.92
Proxy access proposals proceed from a notion that proxy materials should
be the shareholders' documents, and not the incumbent board's alone. Under
this view, proxy statements should include, alongside the biographies of the
incumbent board's nominees, biographies of certain shareholder nominees,
with the nominees from both camps listed side by side on a single proxy card. 9
B. The Comment Period
The SEC CBA in the 2009 Proposing Release runs twenty-three pages. It
reasons that incumbent directors faced with challengers with access to company
proxy materials should be expected to work harder and improve company
performance. In the SEC CBA, the SEC stated that it expected improved
company performance once some directors were replaced and also anticipated
improved performance even where incumbents were not challenged-much
less replaced-reasoning again that the prospect of removal is likely to improve
performance. The footnotes to this Section cited more than two dozen papers
from leading journals, including the American Economic Review, the Journal of
89. For a history, see J. Robert Brown, Jr., The SEC, Corporate Governance and Shareholder
Access to the BoardRoom, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1339 (2008).
90. For a description of the proxy regime prior to the 2010 rule, see Facilitating Shareholder
Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,670 (Sept. 16, 2010).
91. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. REV.
1347, 1384 (2011).
92. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,670 (Sept. 16,
2010).




Finance, and the Journal of Accounting Research.94 The cited studies showed
that hybrid boards-that is, boards containing a minority of dissidents-were
associated with improved shareholder value. The SEC cited other studies
showing that even in companies where no dissidents were elected to the board,
merely increasing the prospect of board accountability to shareholders creates
shareholder value.95
The SEC CBA explored the contrary view as well, citing comment letters
to previous proxy access proposals (including comments of both the Business
Roundtable and the Chamber), which argued that proxy access nominations
would distract the board from more important responsibilities, induce them to
take costly actions to mollify dissidents, and create polarization and disruption
in boardroom dynamics that would impair, rather than enhance, board decision-
94. See 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,753-71 (citing LAWRENCE D. BROWN & MARCUS L. CAYLOR, THE
CORRELATION BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COMPANY PERFORMANCE (2004); CHRIS
CERNICH ET AL., IRCC INST. FOR CORP. RESPONSIBILITY, EFFECTIVENESS OF HYBRID BOARDS (2009),
http://www.irrcinstitute.org/pdfIlRRC_05_09_EffectiveHybridBoards.pdf, BETH YOUNG, THE
CORPORATE LIBRARY, THE LIMITS OF PRIVATE ORDERING: RESTRICTIONS ON SHAREHOLDERS' ABILITY
TO INITIATE GOVERNANCE CHANGE AND DISTORTIONS OF THE SHAREHOLDER VOTING PROCESS (2009),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-568.pdf; Ali C. Akyol et al., Shareholders in the
Boardroom: Wealth Effects of the SEC's Proposal to Facilitate Director Nominations, 47 J. FIN.
QUANT. ANALYSIS 1029 (2012); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response to Increasing Shareholder Power:
Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006); Brad M. Barber,
Monitoring the Monitor: Evaluating CalPERS' Activism, 16 J. INVESTING 66 (2007); Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409 (2005); Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65 BUS. LAW. 329 (2010);
Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009);
Marco Becht et al., Corporate Governance and Control, in IA HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF
FINANCE I (George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2003); Andrea Beltratti & Ren6 M. Stulz, The Credit
Crisis Around the Globe: Why Did Some Banks Perform Better?, 105 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2012); Lisa
Borstadt & Thomas Zwirlein, The Efficient Monitoring Role ofProxy Contests: An Empirical Analysis
of Post-Contest Control Changes and Firm Performance, 21 FIN. MGMT. 22 (1992); Bonnie G.
Buchanan et al., Shareholder Proposal Rules and Practice: Evidence from a Comparison of the United
States and United Kingdom, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 739 (2012); Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate
Governance "Fail' During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 BUS. LAW.
1 (2009); James F. Cotter et al., Do Independent Directors Enhance Target Shareholder Wealth During
Tender Offers?, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 195 (1997); Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity
on Corporate Boards ofDirectors, 76 TuL. L. REV. 1363 (2002); Olubunmi Faleye, Classified Boards,
Firm Value, and Managerial Entrenchment, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 501 (2007); Jerry Goodstein et al., The
Effects of Board Size and Diversity on Strategic Change, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 241 (1994); Paul
Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003); Jeffrey N.
Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing Shareholder Power: Forget Issuer Proxy Access and
Focus on E-Proxy, 61 VAND. L. REV. 475 (2008); Re-Jin Guo et al., Undoing the Powerful Anti-
Takeover Force ofStaggered Boards, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 274 (2008); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S.
Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Board of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO, 88 Am. EcoN.
REV. 96 (1998); David F. Larcker et al., The Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Regulation, 101
J. FIN. ECON. 431 (2011); Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefit of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV.
789, 789 (2007); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. DiGuglielmo, How Many Masters Can a Director
Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761 (2008); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, A Comment on the SEC Shareholder Access Proposal 17 (UCLA Sch. of Law Law & Econ.
Research Paper No. 3-22, 2003), http://ssm.com/abstract-470121; Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Control
of Corporate Decisions: Shareholders vs. Management (May 29, 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssm.com/abstract-965559.
95. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,761 n.915.
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making. 96 The SEC CBA also recognized the possibility that some investors
might use the nomination process to extract private gain through board
decisions at the expense of other shareholders, a reference the SEC would later
argue was a tacit recognition of the potential, decried by the petitioners in the
proxy access case, for blackmail by union pension plans.9 7
Opposition from public companies and their Washington lobbies was
wholly disproportionate to the modest cost savings the provisions would have
provided to nominating shareholders.98 The SEC may have put its finger on the
true reason for issuer opposition when it noted that the benefit of including
shareholders' nominees in the company's proxy materials might be "a
significant improvement in [the nominating shareholder's] ability to have its
nominees evaluated by shareholders in the same matter as they evaluate
management's nominees."99 The SEC, in other words, based its rule on the
classic agency problem of ensuring management accountability to shareholders.
The rule's opponents conflated the interests of the management they
represented with those of most shareholders, viewing the rule as benefitting
only shareholders who were public and union pension funds and activist
investors, whose interests they claimed diverged systematically from those of
other shareholders.
The Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce mounted a
highly professional joint attack on the proposed rule, retaining the same counsel
that had won the Chamber and American Equity cases. Their opening salvo was
a 114-page comment letter that reads like a brief, with a twenty-five page
expert report from NERA Economic Consulting (the NERA Report)
attached.1' Like the petitions that began those earlier cases, the comment
letter's leading legal contention, pressed for fifteen pages, was that the SEC
lacked statutory authority to adopt a proxy access rule (an issue later mooted by
the Dodd-Frank Act's express grant of such authority).' 0' The Business
Roundtable's comment letter argued that, far from enhancing shareholder
96. Id. at 56,756-76.
97. Id. at 56,766.
98. Id. at 56,756 (noting that the $18,000 savings involved in a hypothetical typical contest
was not, in and of itself, "significant enough to drive the behavior of shareholders in large public
companies").
99. Id. at 56,758. This non-quantitative, semiotic analysis of the effects of the rule was not
challenged by the Business Roundtable or discussed in the Business Roundtable opinion.
100. Letter from Alexander M. Cutler, Chair, Corp. Leadership Initiative, Bus. Roundtable, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 24-44 (Aug. 17, 2009),
http://businessroundtable.org/uploads/hearings-letters/downloads/BRTCommentLettertoSECon_
File NoS7-10-09.pdf [hereinafter Business Roundtable Comment Letter]; see also ELAINE BUCKBERG
& JONATHAN MACEY, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, REPORT ON EFFECTS OF PROPOSED SEC RULE
14A-1 I ON EFFICIENCY, COMPETITIVENESS AND CAPITAL FORMATION, IN SUPPORT OF COMMENTS BY
BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (2009), http://www.nera.com/upload/BuckbergMaceyReportFINAL.pdf
[hereinafter NERA REPORT].




value, proxy access would in fact reduce it.102 The Business Roundtable's
NERA Report claimed that "companies with dissident board members
substantially underperform compared to their peers," citing a study by David
Ikenberry and Josef Lakonishok that we discuss in greater detail below.103
In 2010, after receiving and reviewing the Business Roundtable's
comment letter, along with approximately 600 others,'" the SEC decided to
raise the threshold for eligibility to use the streamlined access granted by the
rule to shareholders or groups that had maintained three percent ownership for
at least three years. This ownership requirement substantially reduced the
number of entities that could rely on these proxy access rules.105 To ensure that
the public had notice of the material facts the SEC relied upon in this rule-
making, several weeks before the rule was issued, the SEC publicly released
the distribution statistics its staff economists had prepared, showing the number
of companies and shareholder groups that would qualify for proxy access under
different thresholds.10 6
The Adopting Release reflected the expectation that the rule would act,
both directly and indirectly, to increase shareholder value-both through the
presence of newcomers on the board, and through the in terrorem effect of the
prospect of challenger-proposed directors, or new members entering the club
who had not been properly introduced through current members. 0 7 The agency
recognized that important stakeholders, including two dissenting
commissioners, disagreed with this prediction and it discussed these critiques at
length. 0 8 The Adopting Release included a lengthy discussion of potential
adverse effects on board performance,1 09 and of the costs of incremental
complexity in the proxy process. The cost discussion went on to recap the out-
of-pocket costs involved, noting repeatedly that its numerical estimates,
102. Id. at 99-101.
103. NERA REPORT, supra note 100, at 9 (citing David Ikenberry & Josef Lakonishok,
Corporate Governance Through the Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications, 66 J. BUS. 405 (1993))
(emphasis added).
104. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,669.
105. Id. at 56,774.
106. Id. at 56,669 ("The Commission re-opened the comment period as of December 18, 2009
for thirty days to provide interested persons the opportunity to comment on additional data and related
analyses that were included in the public comment file at or following the close of the original comment
period.").
107. Id. at 56,753-71.
108. Id. at 55,670; see also Kathleen L. Casey, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Statement at Open Meeting to Adopt Amendments Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director
Nominations (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch082510klc.htm ("The
paradigm of a power struggle between directors and shareholders is one that activist, largely
institutional, investors assiduously promote, and this rule illustrates a troubling trend in our recent and
ongoing rulemaking in favor of empowering these shareholders through, among other things,
increasingly federalized corporate governance requirements. Yet, these shareholders do not necessarily
represent the interests of all shareholders, and the Commission betrays its mission when it treats these
investors as a proxy for all shareholders.").
109. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,762; id. at 56,772-75.
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including the frequency of election contests, had been made "for purposes of
the PRA analysis" only.o1 0
The SEC CBA in the Adopting Release also discussed the studies cited by
the NERA Report and other relevant studies at some length, concluding that the
evidence was mixed, and that some of the studies on both sides had
methodological flaws."' The SEC relied on a study by J. Harold Mulherin and
Annette Poulsen,I12 which noted that the Ikenberry performance data cited in
the NERA Report were derived from a data set that had excluded all the firms
that had been acquired or otherwise sold following the appearance of the
dissident directors on the board, thus excluding from the sample the group of
companies that accounted for most of the wealth gains from the proxy contests
in question.113 The Adopting Release also noted that the Borstadt paper cited by
the NERA Report had actually concluded that "'dissident activity leads to gains
for shareholders and is often followed by corporate reforms . . . such that the
realized gains over the contest period appear to be permanent,"' and that a
survey article on corporate governance confirmed that this is the current
academic consensus, stating that "[t]he latest evidence suggests that proxy
fights provide a degree of managerial disciplining and enhance shareholder
value."ll 4
The SEC adopted the proxy access rule on August 25, 2010 by a vote of
three-to-two. Despite the express grant of statutory authority, one of the
dissenting commissioners expressed her (prescient) belief at the Open Meeting
"that the rule is so findamentally and fatally flawed that it will have great
difficulty surviving judicial scrutiny." 5
C. The Challenge to the Rule
The Business Roundtable quickly filed its challenge petition along with a
motion for a stay.116 The Business Roundtable brief made its economic
argument in four parts, arguing that the SEC: (a) erroneously attributed the
rules' costs to state law, (b) underestimated the frequency of election and failed
to estimate their costs, (c) failed to address the impact of union and government
110. Id. at 56,764-71.
111. For a discussion of the studies, see id. at 56,755-76.
112. J. Harold Mulherin & Annette B. Poulsen, Proxy Contests and Corporate Change:
Implications for Shareholder Wealth, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 279 (1998).
113. Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 103, at 408 ("Companies not followed by
Compustat were removed from the sample.").
114. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,762 (citing Becht et
al., supra note 94).
115. Casey, Statement at Open Meeting, supra note 108.
116. See Petition for Review, Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(No. 10-1305). On October 4, 2010, the SEC consented to stay the rule's effective date pending the
judgment of the Court. See Notice of Stay of Effective and Compliance Dates, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,641
(October 20, 2010).
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pension plans, and (d) erroneously assumed that in some cases companies
would not actively oppose access candidates. The court ultimately devoted
meaningful discussion to each of these economic arguments.
The Business Roundtable brief devoted little attention to empirical studies
of the impact of proxy access on share price. In a footnote, the brief cited the
NERA Report and one of the studies cited therein, noting that the SEC had
"quibbled" with the methodology and conclusions of these studies and noting
the SEC's own caveats about one of the studies finding positive effects of
boards composed of both incumbents and dissidents." 7  The Business
Roundtable brief did not otherwise mention the empirical studies, much less
question the SEC's treatment of those studies. It certainly did not argue that the
studies constituted a ground for invalidating the rule. 18
The SEC brief did not touch on the empirical studies either. Nonetheless,
responding to the Business Roundtable's argument that it was required to
provide empirical support for its predictive judgments, the SEC argued:
Any assessment of the economic effects of Rule 14a-l 1, which creates for the first time a
mechanism for shareholders to use company proxy materials to nominate director candidates,
is necessarily predictive and hence uncertain. As this Court has explained, "predictive
calculations are a murky science in the best of circumstances, and the [agency] naturally has
no access to infallible data about [circumstances] that do not exist." Cablevision Sys. Corp.,
597 F.3d at 1314. In such a case, an agency must "rel[y] on its own expertise to evaluate
existing evidence" and make a judgment about how to proceed. Rural Cellular Assoc. v. FCC,
588 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In so doing, the Commission must only "acknowledge factual
uncertainties and identify the considerations it found persuasive. "119
D. The Opinion of the Court
In July 2011, a unanimous panel of the D.C. Circuit handed down an
opinion vacating the rule, finding the Commission to have acted arbitrarily and
capriciously by failing "adequately to assess the economic consequences" of
the rule. 120 Those economic consequences included costs and benefits, as well
as the impact of shareholders with special interests. Under the cost-benefit
rubric, the court disagreed with the Commission's observation that some proxy
access candidates might not be vigorously opposed, with its estimate of the
frequency of election contests and, most importantly, with its assessment of
empirical studies of the effect on stock prices of proxy contests and hybrid
boards. 121
117. Opening Brief of Petitioners at 32 n.4, Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144 (No. 10-
1305).
118. Id.
119. Initial Brief of Respondent at 36, Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144 (No. 10-1305).
120. Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148.
121. Hybrid boards are incumbent-majority boards including some dissident members. The
proxy access rule was at least arguably designed to create hybrid boards rather than induce a proxy
contest for corporate control. The court offered why it found the hybrid board studies "unpersuasive."
Id.
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1. Who Botched the Job?
As detailed above, the SEC thought it had won the skirmish over
empirical data at the adopting release level when the petitioners effectively
dropped that argument on appeal. It was neither briefed nor argued. Undeterred,
Judge Ginsburg reached back into selected portions of the record to resurrect
this issue as a centerpiece of the opinion.122 Neglecting the "extreme degree of
deference" the court formerly admitted it owed to expert agency interpretations
of scientific data, 123 the Business Roundtable opinion rejected the SEC's
assessment of the empirical evidence, holding: "In view of the admittedly (and
at best) 'mixed' empirical evidence, we think the Commission has not
sufficiently supported its conclusion that increasing the potential for election of
directors nominated by shareholders will result in improved board performance
and shareholder value." 24
The opinion summarilyl25 dismissed the SEC's extensive review of the
empirical evidence. 126 The court singled out "[o]ne commenter, for example,
[who] submitted an empirical study showing that when dissident directors win
board seats, those firms underperform peers by 19 to 40%."127 The opinion
failed to inform readers of the opinion that the "commenter" in question was
none other than petitioner Business Roundtable itself The opinion also
inaccurately referred to the NERA Report as an "empirical study" without
noting that NERA was the Business Roundtable's paid consultant.128 The
striking forty percent figure is from the Ikenberry/Lakonishok study, cited in
the NERA Report.
The fact that the opinion mistook the NERA Report for an empirical study
cited in that report matters. We note first that readers of the opinion are entitled
to know whether a finding is made by experts the petitioner engaged or by
authors of an independent study. This is especially true if the paid experts turn
out to have used the data in the independent study to reach a conclusion very
different from the conclusions the study's own authors drew from their data.
This appears to have been the case here: in their paper, Ikenberry and
Lakonishok state that they considered and rejected the explanation accorded
122. See J. Robert Brown Jr., The SEC and the Non-Cost Benefit Analysis Analysis (Part 1),
RACE TO THE BOTTOM (Apr. 23, 2012, 6:01 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/homelthe-sec-
and-the-non-cost-benefit-analysis-analysis-part-1.html ("[W]hatever one thinks of the DC Circuit's
opinion, . . . the decision does not really criticize the economic analysis used by the Commission.
Instead, the court bought off on a mish mash of criticism of the staff's approach, almost none of which
would be corrected by a more rigorous cost benefit analysis.").
123. Chamber I, 412 F.3d at 143.
124. Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 151.
125. See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 12, at 25 ("[T]he court's own analysis of the empirical
data is extremely cursory, particularly in contrast to that of the Commission.").
126. See sources cited supra note 94.





their results by the NERA Report-the idea that proxy fights reduce
shareholder value. The study's authors found "this downward drift in returns
for dissident victories . . . both unexpected and puzzling," rejecting the
"contention that proxy contests destroy value," since that would "suggest[] that
shareholders are not rational when they cast their proxies."129 The authors
speculated that the result might be driven by either overly enthusiastic
expectations of future corporate performance held by both dissident and passive
shareholders or by the fact that companies that are successful takeover targets
suffer particularly poor financial condition.130
In sum, it appears that the petitioners' experts came across an alarming
figure in an academic study-a forty percent decline in shareholder value
associated with dissent members on boards. They then interpreted this statistic
as evidence of a causal relationship that the study's own authors, in the
conclusions section of the same paper, rejected as implausible. Undeterred,
they and their clients conflated correlation and causation in a litigation point
tantamount to a headline reading: "Proxy fights reduce shareholder value by
forty percent!"' 3' The court accepted petitioners' assertion uncritically, while
accusing the SEC of paying inadequate attention to the empirical work before
it, and of slipshod economic analysis in general.
As Hayden and Bowdie demonstrate, the court's treatment of the rest of
the economic evidence was no more rigorous or persuasive.132 The opinion
simultaneously accuses the SEC of "discounting" contrary findings
"completely," and of "admit[ting]" that the evidence is "mixed." 3 3 The court
never explains why it found the SEC's admittedly reasoned assessment of the
empirical economic evidence wanting. It never explained why it found two
cited studies "relatively unpersuasive," beyond citing concerns the SEC itself
candidly expressed about one of them.134
Similarly, on the issue of the cost to oppose unqualified nominees, the
court demanded that the SEC make its own estimate, once again importing the
inapposite Public Citizen requirement to "make tough choices about which of
the competing estimates is most p,1ausible, [or] to hazard a guess as to which is
correct."135 The approach the SEC actually took in the Adopting Release-
129. Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 103, at 433.
130. Id. at 433-34.
131. Cf ELAINE BUCKBERG & JONATHAN MACEY, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, REPORT ON
EFFECTS OF PROPOSED SEC RULE 14A-11 ON EFFICIENCY, COMPETITIVENESS AND CAPITAL
FORMATION: IN SUPPORT OF COMMENTS BY BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE 9 (2009), available at
www.nera.com/upload/BuckbergMaceyReport FINAL.pdf.
132. See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 12, at 25-27.
133. Referring, apparently to the studies cited in the NERA Report, the opinion claims that the
SEC "completely discounted" them, "because of questions raised by subsequent studies, limitations
acknowledged by the studies' authors, or (its] own concerns about the studies' methodology or scope."
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discounting the cost claims of commenters by observing that some proxy
access nominees would be deemed qualified and not actively opposed-was
curtly dismissed as "mere speculation."136 Yet, such an assumption appears to
be precisely the sort of "informed conjecture" the SEC was "entitled" to make
under Chamber I.137 It was also a correct conjecture, as any experienced M&A
practitioner knows. Witness the recent advice of a notably vigorous defender of
corporate boards under siege: alongside purely tactical and public relations
maneuvers, Martin Lipton recommends that boards "[g]auge whether the best
outcome is to agree upon board representation and/or strategic business
change in order to avoid a proxy fight."138
The court appears to have applied a new burden of proof-the opposite of
deference 1-to the SEC's rule. The proxy access rule was vacated on
"admittedly (and at best) 'mixed' empirical evidence,"140  evidence that
evidently failed to convince the court. If unclear, unconvincing evidence fails
the test, perhaps the court meant to require that the SEC present "clear and
convincing" evidence-a heavy and unprecedented burden of proof 14 1 Such a
standard would turn the familiar hierarchy of judicial deference regimes on its
head. The Court did not cite-much less reconcile or distinguish-the
Cablevision and Rural Cellular decisions relied upon by the SEC for the
proposition that agencies may rely on their expertise in evaluating contradictory
and murky empirical evidence to make predictive judgments. As such, the
decision represents a striking departure from the measured and balanced tone of
Chamber 1. Its strictures, if followed in future cases, would cast doubt upon the
136. Id.; see also Brown, supra note 12 (noting that the Court misinterpreted a comment letter
from the American Bar Association to mean that the board's fiduciary duty always required a scorched-
earth, take-no-prisoners attitude towards shareholder nominees).
137. Chamber 1, 412 F.3d at 142.
138. Martin Lipton, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG, (Aug. 9, 2012, 9:19 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/20l2/08/09/
dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds (emphasis added). Lipton's post also offers support for the SEC's
premise that a formerly complacent board may be expected to react to the mere threat of a disturbance to
its comfortable incumbency by taking action to increase shareholder value, recommending that boards
"[p]roactively address reasons for any shortfall versus peer company benchmarks; anticipate key
questions and challenges from analysts and activists, and be prepared with answers" and "[rieview ...
basic strategy and the portfolio of businesses in light of possible arguments for spinoffs, share buybacks,
increased leverage, special dividends, sale of the company or other structural changes." Id.
139. See Murphy, supra note 12, at 159; Raso & Eskridge, supra note 77, at 1737.
140. Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151.
141. BETTER MARKETS, supra note 12, at 53; Cox & Baucom, supra note 12, at 1813; and
Murphy, supra note 12, at 163, all agree that an unprecedented and harsh new standard was applied. See
also John Kemp, The Trojan Horse of Cost Benefit Analysis, REUTERS (Jan. 3, 2012),
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2012/01/03/the-trojan-horse-of-cost-benefit-analysis/ ("Whether
quantitative cost benefit calculations are required by the law is unclear. The Administrative Procedure
Act does not explicitly require them, but conservative jurists on the DC Circuit and lawyers like Scalia
have stretched the requirements through case law, and may use the CFTC case to try to push them
further. Ultimately, it will fall to the Supreme Court to decide how far Section 706 requires a quantified




agencies' ability to enact rules that will withstand even flimsy challenges to
their evaluations of economic evidence.
In corporate law, the business judgment rule gives boards the right to be
wrong on occasion-a rule that allows business to be done in the real world.
Absent an analogous deference regime in the context of agency rulemaking-
which would give agencies the right to be imperfect without having their
actions overturned in court-litigation will continue to chill financial regulation
and reform.
2. Valid Criticisms
Some of the court's other criticisms, however, were valid and should be
squarely addressed and corrected in any future proxy access proposing release.
For example, the court pointed out that the release "discounted the costs of
Rule 14a-1 1-but not the benefits-as a mere artifact of the state law right of
shareholders to elect directors."l 4 2 The release repeated its attribution of costs
to state law ad nauseam, in a way that detracted from the persuasiveness of its
presentation. And it is logically inconsistent to attribute the costs to state law
while not crediting state law with the direct and indirect benefits predicted from
the rule, particularly when the financial economics studies referenced
elsewhere in the release could have been cited as measurements of net, rather
than gross, benefits. While the SEC's release did quote and consider
commenters' proxy fight cost estimates, its failure to make its own cost
estimates is puzzling, and could be easily corrected in any future proxy access
proposing release, given the accessibility of such data.
The release also fell short by not addressing forthrightly the Roundtable's
contention that public and union pension plans might abuse the proxy access
process.143 The Adopting Release resorted to euphemism ("shareholders with
narrow interests"1), and alluded only briefly to the mitigating effects of
fiduciary duties and its own requirements to disclose of conflicts of interest.145
A new proposing release for a revamped proxy access rule should forthrightly
address this issue, including an evaluation of the available evidence from the
analogous activities of institutional investors advancing shareholder proposals.
Commenters on the 2009 rule differed as to whether such proposals, when
advanced by union or public pension plans, are typically advanced in good
faith. In a new proposing release, the SEC should take the opportunity to state
its views on this issue, for the public to support or dispute.
142. Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151. This seems to be the basis for the Court's more
general and much quoted conclusion that "the Commission inconsistently and opportunistically framed
the costs and benefits of the rule." Id. at 1148.
143. Id. at 1151-52.
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A future Commission could also decide not to include mutual fund boards
within the ambit of a new proxy access rule. Its stated reasons for including
them in the 2009 rule were weak, and drew a disproportionate share of the
court's scorn. 146 Mutual funds are unique in being both public issuers and
major shareholders of public companies; wearing only their shareholder hats,
mutual funds, through their interest groups, should be expected to favor, not
oppose, proposals to enhance management accountability.
E. No Appeal
Despite the flaws in the D.C. Circuit opinion, the importance of proxy
access, and the dangers to future rulemaking implicit in its precedential value,
the SEC chose not to seek a re-hearing en banc in the proxy access case.147 As a
result, the decision stands. The SEC did not explain the reasons for its inaction.
Perhaps the SEC was concerned with the difficulty of appealing an implicit
standard of review, as opposed to an express departure from precedent.148
Perhaps it shrank from the challenge of refuting each and every one of the
court's criticisms-some of which, as noted above, were well-founded-in a
single short petition. Perhaps it noted that the original panel included three
active judges, meaning that, given the vacancies on the D.C. Circuit, the votes
of five out of six of the remaining active judges would have been necessary to
grant rehearing. Perhaps it feared an even harsher rebuke from Judge Ginsburg
on a denial of rehearing.
A petition for certiorari might have seemed equally futile. Perhaps the
Solicitor General signaled an unwillingness to proceed, for some of the reasons
noted above. Moreover, as is often the case with administrative law issues,
there was no conflict between circuits because all the relevant cases were heard
in the D.C. Circuit.
But the SEC's decision left it-and other independent financial
regulators-in a tough spot as far as future rulemaking is concerned. The
majority of the Dodd-Frank rules, including most of the most important ones,
146. Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150-56.
147. Press Release, Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement on Proxy
Access Litigation (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-179.htm.
148. Whatever we may think of what it did in practice, the Business Roundtable court
announced it was following the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. See Business Roundtable 647 F.3d
at 1148; see also Motor Vehicles Mfirs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
("The scope of review under the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard is narrow and a court is not to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency . . . . We will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if
the agency's path may reasonably be discerned." (intemal quotations omitted)); Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1971) ("In all cases, agency action must be set aside if the
action was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law or if the





remain unadopted, long after their statutory deadlines.149 The GAO noted that
some financial regulatory agencies attributed these delays to litigation risks. 50
Nor were those fears unfounded; as of this writing, a number of challenges to
Dodd-Frank rules are pending in the D.C. Circuit.' Opponents of regulation
find in litigation of this kind a perfect weapon-one that kills regulations while
leaving no fingerprints. It leaves them free to credibly claim that they do not
oppose good regulations, only those in which regulators have acted before
taking the time to understand fully the consequences of their actions. 152
F. Business Roundtable II?
The best way for the SEC to break this cycle of bad opinions is simple: it
should reconsider, re-propose and re-adopt a new proxy access rule. Re-
proposing the proxy access rule might seem like it should be agency's lowest
priority right now, at a time when its rulemaking machinery is still clogged
with Dodd-Frank and JOBS Act mandatory rules. But is it ever too early to
address a root cause of massive backlog and delay?
Many of the factors weighing against seeking re-hearing en banc and
petitioning for certiorari turn positive on this analysis. In place of having to
defend mistakes in the 2010 adopting release, like the blaming of most costs on
state law, 153 the agency will be free to step back and consider those costs
forthrightly and consistently. Instead of being chained to dubious policy
choices, like the inclusion of mutual fund boards, the Commission will be free
to reconsider them. By cutting away the chaff, the agency can focus attention in
the proceeding and the next appeal on what it got right the first time: the rule
itself, and the empirical evidence in favor of its positive effects on stock prices.
The SEC's economic case will be bolstered by an important econometric
study conducted in the wake of the litigation itself. Harvard economists used
the litigation itself as an event study to assess the impact of the rule on stock
149. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 13-195, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM:
REGULATORS HAVE FACED CHALLENGES FINALIZING KEY REFORMS AND UNADDRESSED AREAS POSE
POTENTIAL RISKS (2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651401.pdf.
150. Id. at 23.
151. See, e.g., Inv. Co. Inst. v. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, No. 12-0612 (D.C.
Cir. Dec. 27, 2012); Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n v. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, No.
12-5362 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 16, 2012); Nat'l Ass'n ofMfrs. v. SEC, No. 12-1422 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 2012);
Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, No. 12-1398 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 10, 2012).
152. Leaders of other financial regulatory agencies have also noted publicly that CBA
challenges have stretched scarce resources and threaten to delay rulemaking. See, e.g., Silla Brush, U.S.
Regulators 'Paralyzed' by Cost-Benefit Suits, Chilton Says, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 8, 2012, 6:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-08/u-s-regulators-paralyzed-by-cost-benefit-suits-chilton-
says.html (noting a legal challenge to a CFTC rule and reporting Commissioner Bart Chilton's argument
that Dodd-Frank opponents have used lawsuits challenging agency cost-benefit analysis to hinder the
rulemaking process).
153. See infra note 142.
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prices, finding statistically significant positive effects from the rule.154 This
real-time back testing was far more pertinent than any of the economic studies
cited in the release and the rule challenge, which dealt only with analogous
situations, and not with market reactions to the very rule in question. The
researchers ranked public companies based on their "proxy accessibility"--that
is, by the number of significant stockholders of three or more years standing-
and examined stock price movements both on the day the SEC unanticipated
announcements that it would suspend the rule in response to the Business
Roundtable challenge and that it would not appeal. Looking at the differential
stock price movements in more and less proxy accessible companies on those
dates, the authors concluded that financial markets placed a positive value on
proxy access.1ss
On the other hand, a Business Roundtable II case would be heard by the
same panel as before. Judge Ginsburg went out of his way, in a subsequent
opinion in a wholly-unrelated EPA case, to aver in dictum that the "evidentiary
problem in Business Roundtable was not limited to the agency's insufficient
treatment of any one study ... it was the agency's larger failure to deal with the
weight of the evidence against it. , This dictum, and more set out in the
margin,157 are a taste of what the SEC might have received had it sought
rehearing en bane on its original proxy access release. This tone, however,
should not deter the SEC from coming back into court with improvements.
154. Bo Becker et al., Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from
the Business Roundtable Challenge, 56 J. L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2013), http://ssrn.com/
abstract-1695666. An amicus brief in the original Business Roundtable case cited this study to the court,
but it was not mentioned in the opinion. For additional empirical support for the positive effects of
shareholder activism, see Lucian Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value,
113 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=2248111.
155. Another study, which states that it "seeks to refute in part" the Harvard study, largely
validates it instead. See Thomas Stratmann & J.W. Verret, Does Shareholder Proxy Access Damage
Share Value in Small Publicly Traded Companies?, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1434 n.15 (2012).
Stratmann and Verret report negative stock-price effects, but their analysis is confined to the smallest of
public companies-those with market capitalizations of less than $75 million. Even this limited finding
can be questioned, as it assumes without justification that the market reaction with respect to small
public companies was confined to the small-issuer exemption and not to other provisions of the rule that
may have been weaker (e.g., less encouraging of proxy access) than the market expected. In addition,
the paper depends on the dubious assumption that a small-issuer exemption was so widely anticipated in
the market that its absence from the final rule was unanticipated.
156. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 1342, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
157. Id. ("The API mistakenly places much weight upon our recent decision in Business
Roundtable v. SEC. As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the EPA's analysis of the proposed
NAAQS was materially better than the analysis for which we faulted the SEC in that case. There the
agency had ignored 'numerous studies submitted by commenters that reached the opposite result' and
relied instead upon 'two relatively unpersuasive studies.' Putting aside the analytical incoherence of the
SEC's rationale, which would have been fatal by itself, the evidentiary problem in Business Roundtable
was not limited to the agency's insufficient treatment of any one study, though there was that; it was the
agency's larger failure to deal with the weight of the evidence against it. The EPA's analysis at issue





In American Petroleum, the court applied the governing standards
faithfully, holding that "[a]n agency's action is arbitrary and capricious if it
'entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem [or] offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency."" 5 8 Faced with a re-thought rule, and a scholarly release presenting a
full and thoughtful assessment of the econometric evidence (instead of one in
which a truncated discussion is relegated to footnotes), the Court might well be
inclined not only to uphold the new rule, but to announce that the agency's
expertise in financial economics is entitled to judicial deference.
A future opinion upholding a new proxy access rule would yield positive
effects far beyond those of the proxy access rule alone. Winning any case, but
particularly this one, would signal to all financial regulators, regulated entities
and issuers that the will of Congress cannot be lightly dismissed, and that the
agency will persevere when its judgments are correct. In a jurisprudential
landscape that today tells regulators how not to do it, such an opinion would
serve as a lodestar for conducting economic analysis in a way that is both
feasible and meaningful-not for the SEC alone, but for other financial
regulators with similar requirements.
IlI. Congressional Responses to Business Roundtable
A. Testimony and Inspector General Reports
Like the Chamber I case before it, remanding the mutual fund governance
rule, 59 the Business Roundtable decision moved the SEC's critics in Congress
to action. 160 SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro was immediately called to explain
to the House Oversight Committee what she planned to do to correct the
inadequacies in economic analysis noted in the opinion,' 6' and the minority
members of the Senate Banking Committee requested that the inspectors
general of the SEC and seven other federal financial regulators to conduct
investigations and report back in a matter of weeks. 62 The SEC's inspector
158. Id. at 1350 (quoting North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 906 (D.C. Cir. 2008)); see 5
U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
159. See Sherwin, supra note 53, at 27-29.
160. The case attracted attention on Capitol Hill. See, e.g., CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R41974, COST-BENEFIT AND OTHER ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS IN THE RULEMAKING
PROCESS 18 (2011), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41974.pdf; CURTIS W. COPELAND, ADMIN.
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REGULATORY ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS 31 (2012), http://www.acus.gov/
wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/06/Final-Recommendation-2012-1 -Regulatory-Analysis.pdf.
161. See, e.g., Letter from Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, U.S. H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't
Reform, to Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Apr. 29, 2011) (on file with
authors).
162. See KYLE REPORT, supra note 29, at iii ("On May 4, 2011, the SEC Office of Inspector
General (OIG) received a letter from several members of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs requesting that the Inspector General review the economic analyses
performed by the SEC in connection with six specific rulemaking initiatives undertaken pursuant to the
Dodd-Frank Act.").
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general, citing the time needed to engage a qualified expert, elected to conduct
a subsequent, more detailed investigation, and issued a second report several
months later. 6 3
This second SEC IG Report, led by financial economist Pete Kyle (the
Kyle Report), noted the internal staff efforts the SEC was already making, and
its efforts to involve its economists more deeply in the rule writing process.
The Kyle Report also noted that the SEC had begun to develop a theoretical
framework for economic analysis of rules, and was experimenting with
combining the SEC CBA and ECCF consideration sections.16 5 A key
recommendation of the Kyle Report attempted to correct one unfortunate trend
in the case law: the report advocated focusing on large-scale direct and indirect
economic effects of rules, and placing less emphasis on relatively trivial PRA
costs. 166
These pressures accelerated the trends already underway at the SEC'6 1 to
give its economists, and economic analysis in general, a more prominent role in
its rulemaking process.
B. A Bill to Codify Business Roundtable
Shortly after the inspector general reports, Senator Richard Shelby
introduced the Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2011 (FRRA),1 69 a
bill focused, like the Business Roundtable decision and its predecessors, on the
importance of economic analysis of financial regulations.170 We view the
FRRA as no less than a codification of an expansive reading of the Business
Roundtable decision.' 7' Unlike the ECCF amendments, the FRRA explicitly
imposes a substantive requirement on agency rulemaking. It would restrict the
rulemaking authority of the SEC and nine financial regulatory agencies to cases
in which a cost-benefit analysis conducted under its standards has demonstrated
163. See id.
164. Id. at 15.
165. Id. at vi.
166. Id. at 12-15.
167. Id.
168. See infra Subsection II.B.2.
169. S. 1615, 112th Cong. (2011). The FRRA has been reintroduced as the Financial
Responsibility Act of 2013, S.450, 113th Cong. (2013).
170. See, e.g., Kemp, supra note 141, at 3 (noting that language in a Wall Street Journal
editorial echoing language in the FRRA is "not really about cost benefit analysis at all in the narrow
sense. The standard [it] seek[s] to enforce would be impossible to meet.").
171. Critics of the SEC have also called upon Congress to codify the Business Roundtable
decision. See, e.g., The SEC's Aversion to Cost-Benefit Analysis: Hearing Before House Oversight and
Government Reform Subcommittee on TARP, Financial Services and Bailouts of Public and Private
Programs, 12th Cong. 40-53 (2012) (statement of Henry G. Manne, Dean Emeritus, George Mason
University School of Law) [hereinafter Manne Testimony] (advocating that the ECCF "be strengthened




that the quantified benefits of the regulation exceed its quantified costs.i12 The
FRRA's rules for performing the analysis reflect an acute sensitivity to costs
and a profound skepticism about benefits."
Under the FRRA, rules that an agency wishes to adopt on the basis of
benefits it cannot quantify would become mere recommendations to Congress,
effective only if both houses adopt a Joint Resolution waiving the
quantification requirements and directing the agency to publish the rule."' In
this, the FRRA resembles the REINS Act.175 This exultation of the quantitative
over the qualitative echoes Timpinaro, which focused on the SEC's failure to
include a particular regression analysis at the expense of the broader discussion
of costs and benefits.7
The FRRA takes a number of worthy, but patently unattainable, goals of
CBA analysis and requires them by law as a predicate to regulation. Here are
just a few of the twelve findings the FRRA would require of agencies:
* A quantitative and qualitative assessment of all anticipated direct and indirect costs
and benefits of the regulation (as compared to a benchmark that assumes the absence
of regulation), including compliance costs, effects on economic activity, net job
creation (excluding jobs related to ensuring compliance with the regulation),
efficiency, competition, and capital formation; regulatory administrative costs and
costs imposed by the regulation on State, local, or tribal governments or other
regulatory authorities. . .
* Identification and assessment of all available alternatives to the regulation, including
modification of an existing regulation or statute, together with an explanation of why
the regulation meets the objectives of the regulation more effectively than
alternatives...
* An assessment of how the burden imposed by the regulation will be distributed
among market participants, including whether consumers, investors or small
businesses will be disproportionately burdened. ..
* An assessment of the extent to which the regulation is inconsistent, incompatible, or
duplicative with existing regulations of the agency or those of other domestic and
international regulatory authorities with overlapping jurisdiction...
* An explanation of predicted changes in market structure and infrastructure and in
behavior by market participants, including consumers and investors, assuming they
will pursue their economic interests.
77
While this bill has little hope of advancing unless Senator Shelby becomes
Senate Banking Committee Chairman once again,'78 the FRRA deserves notice,
172. S. 1615 § 3(b)(4)(A) ("[Aln agency may not publish a notice of final rulemaking if the
agency .. . determines that the quantified costs are greater than the quantified benefits,").
173. See id. § 3(a)(6) (requiring agencies to provide an "identification and assessment of all
available alternatives to the regulation" and "an explanation of why the regulation meets the objectives
of the regulation more effectively than the alternatives").
174. See id. § 3(b)(4)(C).
175. Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act, HR. 10, 112th Cong.
(2011). Like the FRRA, this bill would subject agency regulations to congressional approval.
176. See Timpinaro v. SEC, 2 F.3d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
177. Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2011, S. 1615 § 3(a), 112th Cong. (2011).
178. Senator Shelby pledged to the Chamber of Commerce that he would reintroduce his bill
along with legislation to repeal portions of the Dodd-Frank Act. See Yin Wilczek, Shelby Vows to
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if only because Business Roundtable has already moved the status quo
reasonably close to the state of affairs it contemplated in several respects. Now
that the statutory requirement to "consider" whether an action will promote
efficiency has become, in effect, a requirement to "determine" those economic
effects of the rule, those economic effects could be interpreted in future cases to
include some or all of the FRRA's elements. The case law already requires a
thoughtful response to all major comments,179 and under some cases rules with
multiple rationales fail if the court disagrees with any one of them.' 80 Chamber
I mandated an analysis of alternative approaches, while American Equity called
for an assessment of both the pre-existing regulatory regime and the baseline
competitive structure.
The FRRA is part of a larger legislative effort. While the Act is specific to
financial regulators, it shares the goals of other bills in Congress such as the
Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act,'81 which
would suspend the effectiveness of major agency rules pending approval by a
joint resolution of Congress, and the Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis
Act (IARAA),1 82 which would have authorized an Executive Order subjecting
independent regulatory agencies' cost-benefit analysis to OIRA.
Pursue Real' Reform If Republicans Regain Control of Senate, BANKING DAILY (BNA), July 26, 2012.
He did so in early 2013. See Financial Responsibility Act of 2013, S. 450 (113th Cong.).
179. See, e.g., Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 28 F.3d 1288,
1292 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908, 919 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
180. See Nat'l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 468 F.3d 831, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("[W]here
FERC has relied on multiple rationales (and has not done so in the alternative), and we conclude that at
least one of the rationales is deficient, we will ordinarily vacate the order unless we are certain that
FERC would have adopted it even absent the flawed rationale."). But see Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. v.
FERC, 773 F.2d 327, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("We obviously cannot affirm a decision based on three
different and inconsistent answers to the same fundamental questions. In its brief, FERC elides this
inconsistency by ignoring its second and third answers and urging only the first, which it says we
accepted as sufficient in a closely analogous context in Public Systems II. This, we think, is post hoc
rationalization-though by subtraction of old reasons rather than addition of new ones. Unless we can
agree that FERC would necessarily have reached the same decision on the basis of the first reason (the
multiple regulatory disparities rationale), we would in effect be affirming on a ground different from the
one on which the agency based its decision, in contravention of the Chenery principle.").
181. H.R. 10, 112thCong. (2011). Like the FRRA, this bill would subject agency regulations
to congressional approval.
182. S. 3468, 112th Cong. (2012). IARAA would codify, and therefore likely rigidify, many
criteria in E.O. 12866 and Circular A-4. While section 4(a) of the bill would exempt compliance with
the OIRA-agency dialog from judicial review, section 4(b) would deem "any determination, analysis, or
explanation produced by the agency ... pursuant to an Executive order issued under this Act ... part of
the whole record of agency action" in connection with judicial review, thus effectively reversing the
exemption from judicial review central to traditional 12,866 Executive Orders. Id. at § 4(b). IARAA is
thus an invitation to litigation by regulated entities, putting even more weapons at their disposal. A more
balanced and effective approach would be to reverse the import of sections 4(b) and 4(c) of the Act, and
combine the cost benefit analysis contemplated by the act with each independent agency's existing
economic requirements (ECCF, in the case of the SEC), and make the integrated analysis subject to the
exclusive review of impartial OIRA, exempting it from judicial review.
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IV. The SEC's Response: Better Economic Analysis
A. The SEC's Economic Expertise
Despite a history of prominent senior SEC staff economists dating back to
1935,183 the SEC has not traditionally held itself out as an agency with
particular expertise in economics-in contrast to other financial regulators like
the Federal Reserve Board, which is led and staffed by economists.
Nonetheless, the SEC's Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation
(RSFI) harbors a veritable faculty of financial economists, with twenty-three
members of its well-published staff dedicated to rulemaking support, and many
of them on leave from professorships at major universities.18 The Division,
therefore, is in a position to claim true expertise in the discipline. Commanding
judicial deference begins with asserting expertise,185 but the public faces of the
lawyer-dominated SEC may have been reluctant to assume a public stance that
would have strengthened the hand of another, more inward-looking
professional group within the agency.
The SEC began implementing significant changes only in the wake of the
Business Roundtable decision. The artificial separation of the SEC CBA and
ECCF consideration sections was finally abandoned, beginning with the
Municipal Advisors Registration release.' 86 While this change may appear
minor, it was later recognized and endorsed in the Kyle Report.' Releases
under this new format contained a single "Economic Analysis" section,
subsuming the old CBA and ECCF consideration sections. Those integrated
sections began to track more closely the format of OIRA CBA: they began with
183. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, TELEPHONE DIRECTORY, July 1, 1935, posted in the
Virtual Museum and Archive of the History of Financial Regulation of the SEC Historical Society,
http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/papers/1930/1935_07 01_SEC Telephon
eDir.pdf For example, Technical Advisor Paul Gourrich was the author of IS CAPITALISM ON TRIAL
(1931), GOVERNMENT AND BUSINEsS (1938) and DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP (1939). Kemper
Simpson, Economic Advisor and Director of the Office of Policy Research, authored CAPITALIZATION
OF GOODWILL (1921), INTRODUCTION TO WORLD ECONOMICS (1934) and BIG BUSINESS, EFFICIENCY
AND FASCISM (1941). The office or division in which the SEC's economists have worked has been
known by many different names over the years, including the Office of Policy Research, the Economic
Research Section, the Directorate of Economic and Policy Research, the Office of Economic Analysis
and is currently known as the Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation. The authors have
compiled a list of previous names that are available at http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.
rackspacecloud.com/collection/papers/1930/1935_0101 SECEconomistsT.pdf
184. Like the economists at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the SEC's
economists are highly-credentialed and well-published. Compare http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/
economistbios.shtml, with http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/theeconomists.htm.
185. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(noting that the "regulatory scheme is technical and complex" in deferring to the EPA).
186. Registration of Municipal Advisers, 76 Fed. Reg. 824, 872-78 (Jan. 6, 2011) (codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
187. See KYLE REPORT, supra note 29, at 19; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, REPORT OF REVIEW OF ECONOMIC ANALYSES CONDUCTED BY THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION IN CONNECTION WITH DODD-FRANK ACT RULEMAKINGS (2011),
http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/Auditslnspections/201 1/Report6_1 3_11 .pdf.
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a statement of the problem being addressed, provided a baseline describing the
existing situation, and assessed the costs and benefits of moving to the new
regime the proposed rule would establish.
In 2012 testimony before a House subcommittee on the proxy access case,
SEC Chairman Schapiro has indicated that this change has become the new
norm. Schapiro promised a concerted effort to reform the SEC's rulemaking
process and expand the agency's already strong team of financial economists-
thus strengthening their role, and the role of economic analysis itself, in the
rulemaking process. She even suggested that the Chief Economist will have
formal sign-off, tantamount to a veto, on the economic analysis of rules. Such a
procedural step can be e Xected to increase the power and prestige of
economists within the SEC.'1
To live up to commitments made to Congress in the wake of Business
Roundtable, and to implement the 2012 Guidance, the SEC is strengthening its
economic staff as well. An additional sixteen Ph.D. economists are already to
be joining the RSFI economists, with even greater additions requested for the
future.189
The impact of these changes is already being felt. Real economic analysis
was decisive in garnering a unanimous Commission vote around the vexed
question of defining swap intermediaries,190 a key parameter of derivatives
regulation commended to the Commission's discretion by the Dodd-Frank Act.
An empirical analysis of market transactions revealed clear break points that
Commissioners with differing predispositions could rally around. The staff's
economic analysis prevented the deadlock or divided vote that would have
188. Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on TARP of the H. Comm. on Gov't and Oversight,
112th Cong. 5, 5 (2012) (statement of Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n) ("The
SEC has for years considered economic analysis to be a critical element of its rule writing process ....
Our new guidance [on economic analysis] reflects many of the current best practices in economic
analysis, which the agency will continue to refine in the future as necessary."). As the title of the hearing
suggests, several other witnesses at the hearing strongly criticized the SEC's economic analysis efforts.
See, e.g., id. at 40 (statement of Henry G. Manne, Dean Emeritus, George Mason University School of
Law) ("[T]he SEC's problems with economics don't end with their failure to do the basic kind of
analysis one would expect of an economic regulatory agency. They don't even do the kind of analysis
that Congress has explicitly required them to do.").
189. Julie Goodman, SEC RiskFin To Boost Staff Economic Analysis, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR'S COMPLIANCE REPORTER I (July 30, 2012) (reporting that RiskFin had 60 staffers when
Division Director and Chief Economist Craig Lewis took office in May 2011, and that Lewis expected
that number to increase to around 90 by the end of summer 2012).
190. See Further Definition of "Swap Dealer," "Security-Based Swap Dealer," "Major Swap
Participant," "Major Security-Based Swap Participant" and "Eligible Contract Participant", 77 Fed. Reg.
30,595 (May 23, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 17); see also Hearing Before the H. Subcomm.
on Cap. Markets of the H. Comm on Fin. Serv. (Dec. 12, 2012) (testimony of Robert Cook, Director,
SEC Div. of Trading and Markets), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2012/tsl2l2l2rc.htm, ("As with
other Commission rulemaking efforts, the Commission's Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial
Innovation ("RSFI") was extensively involved in the Commission's development of both of these rule
sets. In particular, RSFI's analysis of single-name credit default swap data was especially informative in
the development of the entity definition rules. This analysis provided critically important information
regarding potential dealing activity in the credit default swap market, which helped the Commission




resulted had some Commissioners reflexively advocated for "tougher" or
"looser" regulation uninformed by data.
Another, even more important contribution of economic analysis to the
policymaking process came recently in breaking the Commission's well-
publicized logjam over money market fund reform. Despite the Reserve Fund's
"breaking the buck," and the unfortunate necessity of federal guaranties
covering the rest of this $3 trillion industry to prevent a catastrophic run on all
the funds,1 91 SEC Chairman Schapiro had been unable to muster support for a
flexible plan offering money market funds their choice of how to enhance their
future stability.1 92 After a non-binding admonition from the Financial Stability
Oversight Council, the RSFI analysis that was originally part of the failed 2012
draft proposing release was expanded and circulated as a stand-alone report,19 3
after which Commissioner Aguilar announced his satisfaction and withdrew his
opposition to the contemplated rule.194
These are examples of how economic analysis should be used in
rulemaking. They demonstrate that professional econometric work can both
solve problems at the Commission level and promote the adoption of important
rules. The amount of work these projects plainly entailed also shows that work
of this kind is not to be assigned lightly, or used to pursue trivialities. The
rational boundary of economic analysis includes the issues that the analysis can
inform in a valuable and cost-effective manner, and excludes those that it
cannot.
B. The 2012 Guidance
The SEC recognized that it had work to do to bring its economic analyses
up to the standards applicable to executive agencies. s Those agencies are
charged with "adopt[ing] a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that
the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs,"196 "bas[ing] [] decisions
on the best reasonably obtainable scientific, technical, economic, and other
information concerning the need for, and consequences of, the intended
191. For an overview, see Perspectives on Money Market Mutual Fund Reforms: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Mary L.
Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2012/
ts062112mls.htm.
192. See Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement on Money
Market Fund Reform (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-166.htm.
193. Memorandum from Div. of Risk, Strategy, and Fin. Innovation, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, to Luis A. Aguilar, Troy A. Paredes, and Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm'rs, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/money-market-funds-memo-2012.pdf.
194. See Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement on Money Market
Funds as to Recent Developments (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/
spchl205l2laa.htm. At this writing, however, the rule has yet to be formally proposed.
195. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993).
196. Id. § 1(b)(6).
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regulation,"l97 and "tailor[ing] its regulations to impose the least burden on
society."198
Decades of agency experience and academic scholarship inform the CBA
conducted by those agencies. The result is that these agencies have defined
boundaries within which they can reasonably assess the costs and benefits of
rules such as dam projects or workplace safety standards.' That body of work,
however, does not map cleanly onto the financial regulatory landscape.200 Most
financial regulators are exempt under Executive Order 12,866 and have not had
the benefit of decades of experience with CBA. 20 They therefore need to begin
this work afresh, informed by scholarship, to build the foundations of their own
economic analysis requirements.
Thanks to internal staff efforts begun years earlier following the Chamber
cases and revived and accelerated with the American Equity remand, the
agency was not caught flat-footed by the need for well thought-out reform. The
2012 Guidance, discussed in more detail in Part IV, codifies the tentative steps
taken in 2011, when the SEC began to replace the separate SEC CBA and
ECCF sections with a single Economic Analysis section, intended to inform
both the Commission and the public. 202 In contrast to its 1999 predecessor, 2 03
which has remained confidential, the 2012 Guidance was made public in March
of 2012 in response to congressional concerns. 204 It acknowledges lessons
learned from the case law and takes a respectful tone toward the cases while
avoiding codification of their overbroad and unworkable dicta. In doing so, it
both respects and subtly and implicitly responds to some of the ambiguities and
misdirection in the case law, staking out sensible positions that, if followed in
future releases, should be defensible in litigation.
The 2012 Guidance:
Expressly equates the benefits of a rule with gains in economic
efficiency (including enhanced competition, lower costs of
capital, reduced transaction costs and elimination of market
197. Id. § 1(b)(7).
198. Id.§ I (b)(11).
199. See Livermore, Cause or Cure?, supra note 19, at 108-14 (describing the areas in which
CBA is most commonly practiced).
200. See Katherine Schipper, How Can We Measure the Costs and Benefits of Changes in
Financial Reporting Standards?, 40 ACCT. & Bus. REs. 309 (2010) (discussing challenges involved in
adapting conventional, health, safety, and environmental CBA to the analysis of financial reporting
standards).
201. Sherwin, supra note 53, at 4.
202. Registration of Municipal Advisers, 76 Fed. Reg. 824, 872-78 (Jan. 6, 2011) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
203. See KYLE REPORT, supra note 29, at 6-14, 45 (discussing SEC's rulemaking handbook,
which "provides guidance applicable to SEC rulemaking and includes guidance specific to developing
cost-benefit analyses"). The handbook was last updated in 1999 but has never been made public. Id. at
45.




failures such as collective action problems), a move that squarely
connects ECCF consideration requirements with OIRA CBA.205
Notes the judge-made "obligation" for the agency to "determine
as best it can the economic implications of the rule," 206 but
correctly equates this with "broad economic issues" of efficiency
207and competition, and not with chasing down trivial costs. In
doing so, it explains why certain facts cannot be ascertained,
despite the risk of being ordered once again to "hazard a
guess."
208
* Expressly connects the references in American Equity to the need
to determine existing levels of competition, price transparency
and information disclosure with the teaching of Circular A-4 that
OIRA CBA begins with the determination of a baseline for
comparison. 209
* Calls upon SEC staff economists to seek out studies and
empirical evidence that bear on predictive judgments, to work
with rulewriters to include these studies in releases for comment,
and to explain clearly why some studies and evidence are given
more weight than others.210
* Approaches the contradiction between the invitation in Chamber
I to engage in "informed conjecture" and Business Roundtable's
subsequent rejection of "mere speculation" by mentioning
neither.
In response to the Kyle Report and congressional inquiries, the SEC is
improving the quality of its economic analysis through collaboration between
policymakers and economists throughout the rulemaking process, recognizing
that valid economic analysis cannot be "tacked on" as an afterthought. Real
involvement of economists in the policymaking is real change in the culture of
211the agency.
205. Id. at 10. As a leading textbook on cost-benefit analysis puts it: "One goal, efficiency,
underlies CBA." ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE
43 (3d ed. 2006).
206. 2012 Guidance, supra note 15, at 10.
207. Id.
208. Id.atl3n.34.
209. Id. at 7.
210. Id. at 13-14.
211. See supra Section IV.A regarding RSFI contributions to swap intermediary definitions
and money market fund reform.
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The SEC should ensure that such involvement pushes staff to more clearly
define the market failure that each rule is intended to address and to define the
markets affected by both the problem and the proposed solution. Such early
planning will increase the connection between the substance of the rule and the
economic analysis. Put differently, the economic analysis will be more
compelling if it influences (rather than merely describes and rationalizes) the
substance of the rule. Relatedly, staff economists should be given autonomy to
construct the ECCF consideration as a dispassionate analysis of tradeoffs, not
an exercise in advocacy. These are sound and constructive responses, and the
contribution that economic data and economic analytic reasoning can make to
rulemaking at the SEC and other financial regulators is potentially great.
C. A Response to Critics ofthe 2012 Guidance
The 2012 Guidance has met with criticism. Better Markets, Inc., a
Washington-based pro-regulatory group,212 has called for its withdrawal,
painting it as an unnecessary and illegitimate abdication of the SEC's
rulemaking authority, especially with regard to rules required under Dodd-
Frank.23
Better Markets believes the ECCF statue should not be construed to
require any form of cost-benefit analysis. Instead, the SEC should adopt "a
more holistic approach to assessing the economic impact of its rules, one that
does not view each rule in isolation, but considers the collective impact on the
public and investors of all the reforms embodied in the Dodd-Frank Act."214
Under this approach, the costs of the Dodd-Frank rules as a whole would be
evaluated against the "enormous" benefits "totaling trillions of dollars,
measured not just in terms of the current crisis but also in light of a potentially
worse financial disaster that may befall our country if reform is not fully
implemented." 215
This "holistic" approach would apparently excuse economic analysis from
any obligation to explicate the means by which any Dodd-Frank rule in
particular-Conflict Minerals, to take an example currently under court
challenge 216-Could itself mitigate any future financial crisis. Indeed, Better
212. According to its website, Better Markets is an organization that "promotes the public
interest in financial reform in the domestic and global capital and commodity markets." BETTER
MARKETS: TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILTY, OVERSIGHT, http://www.bettermarkets.com (last visited
Jan. 28, 2013).
213. BETTER MARKETS, supra note 12, at 59-67.
214. Id. at 67.
215. Id. at 76.
216. Dodd-Frank mandated that the SEC promulgate a rule requiring companies to publicly
disclose their use of conflict minerals. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Adopts Rule for
Disclosing Use of Conflict Minerals (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-
163.htm; see also Opening Brief of Petitioners at 1, Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 12-1422 (D.C. Cir.




Markets appears to deem the fact that Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank
reforms to prevent future financial disasters as conclusive evidence that they
will in fact do so, and that the benefits are therefore so "enormous" as to
outweigh any costs. In this, Better Markets' views may be usefully paired and
contrasted with the views of Professor Henry Manne. Manne argues that
regulation almost invariably does more harm than good and should be
presumed to be counterproductive, but nonetheless praised the SEC's guidance
as a useful step forward.2 17
Professor James Cox and Benjamin Baucom, in an article sharply critical
of the Business Roundtable decision, correctly note that "[t]here is a decided
tone in the D.C. Circuit decisions that the court believes it is they, and not the
SEC, who are the econometricians."218 Admitting that "it is hard to know why
that could be," these authors nonetheless "counsel that the SEC in proposing its
rules should do so as a lawyer, not as an econometrician or empiricist," and
views signs pointing toward the 2012 Guidance as continuing to "blindly
walk[] into a tra it has set for itself," where it will continue to be "hoisted by
its own petard." 1 We disagree, and maintain that if the SEC has an economics
problem, it should look to its little-known band of financial economists for
solutions.
We share other critics' concerns about the Business Roundtable decision,
and agree that "the SEC must fight to over-turn the approach to cost-benefit
analysis set forth in Business Roundtable,"2 20 and recommend fighting it in a
readopted proxy access rule. But the SEC simply cannot turn its back on
decades of SEC Chairmen's commitmentsm' to Congress and decades of
judicial precedent, some of which even predates the ECCF statutes. 2 22
Moreover, there is a legitimate view that OIRA CBA may not be the best
form for ECCF analysis at all, since many financial regulations-particularly
the Dodd-Frank rules-confront situations of uncertainty rather than situations
of risk. Hahn and Sunstein understand cost-benefit analysis to be
a quantitative and qualitative accounting of the effects of regulation, together with a duty to
explain the grounds for action unless the benefits exceed the costs. On this view, the antonym
whether the rule will provide any benefits .. ., [and) the rule will impose staggering costs on American
businesses").
217. See Manne Testimony, supra note 171, at 41.
218. Cox & Baucom, supra note 12, at 1840.
219. Id.
220. BETTER MARKETS, supra note 12, at 58. One ofus even argued last year that "in a perfect
world, the SEC's economic analysis of its rules, while valid and useful, should be exempt by law from
judicial review, the way it is for executive agencies." Bruce R. Kraus, Challenge to SEC Rulemaking,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, December 12, 2011, http://www.pionline.com/article/20111212/
PRINTSUB/312129993.
221. See KYLE REPORT, supra note 29, at 6 (noting that "SEC Chairmen have made a
commitment to Congress that the SEC will conduct cost-benefit or economic analyses in conjunction
with its rulemaking activities").
222. Timpinaro v. SEC, 2 F.3d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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to regulation undertaken without anything like a clear sense of the likely consequences--or
regulation that amounts to a stab in the dark.223
The authors immediately qualify this sweeping pronouncement in an
equally sweeping footnote:
We are assuming throughout that regulators are acting in a situation of risk (where
probabilities can be assigned to various outcomes) rather than uncertainty (where no such
probabilities can be assigned). In a situation of uncertainty, when existing knowledge does not
permit regulators to assign probabilities to outcomes, it is exceedingly hard to do cost-benefit
analysis. In such circumstances, other decision rules may be useful, such as the maximin
principle (choose the policy with the best worst-case outcome.)224
This qualification may be a mere footnote to much environmental, health
and safety regulation-but it is an exception that swallows the rule, as far as
many financial regulations are concerned.225 Certainly, rules under Dodd-
Frank, which are largely designed to prevent or mitigate another once-in-a-
lifetime financial crisis, fall under the category of uncertainty rather than risk.
This distinction suggests why the FRRA's requirements for quantitative
benefits analysis simply make no sense in the context of many financial
regulations. Imposing a quantitative CBA requirement in situations for which
the tool is ill-suited would simply disable regulators from acting in situations of
uncertainty.
Nonetheless, the SEC has adopted a pragmatic view, recognizing that
neither the courts nor its congressional overseers would tolerate its abandoning
economic analysis entirely. Where it makes sense to do so, the agency has
adopted a limited version of the holistic approach. While multiple regulations
are required by statute, the SEC has tried to assess their economic impact as a
group on the market as a whole, with consistent economic analyses across
multiple related rules. It is also consonant with the 2012 Guidance to look to
the mitigation of future crises of great magnitude as a justification for rules.
D. Toward a Guidance 2.0
The SEC is using the 2012 Guidance to integrate economic analysis into
its rulemaking process. The current incarnation of the 2012 Guidance should be
developed dynamically and improved continuously, based on the agency's
experience. The more thorough and well-considered the guidance is, and the
223. Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1499.
224. Id. at 1499 n.37.
225. Roberta Romano suggests that the SEC should respond to this uncertainty by placing an
automatic sunset on rules adopted in response to a crisis. See Romano, supra note 74, at 100. We note
that the SEC has complied fully with the Obama administration's executive order asking independent
regulatory agencies to engage in retrospective review of rules. See Exec. Order No. 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg.
41,587 (July 14, 2011). The SEC issued a request for information on such retrospective review, see





more it allows the agency to tailor the economic analysis to the rule at hand, the
more helpful it will be and the more deference it should command.
The 2012 Guidance was focused on how to write an economic analysis.
Future work of SEC economists and policymaking lawyers should help the
2012 Guidance evolve still further into a meaningful, flexible, and feasible
process for economic analysis of its rules-Guidance 2.0, if you will. Guidance
2.0 should formally recognize that the ECCF factors are, by the express words
of the statute, merely factors that the agency should consider "in addition to" its
primary mission, "the protection of investors" when considering, more broadly
"the public interest." The legislative history of the ECCF statute supports a
continued emphasis on investor protection, 226 in contrast to the FRRA, which is
concerned primarily about the burdens on regulated entities that investor-
protection measures generally entail.227
Guidance 2.0 should also establish and assert the agency's expertise in
financial economics. Moreover, a definitive agency construction of what it
means to "consider" these factors should assert the right of the agency, as an
expert in both financial markets and economics, to draw rational boundaries
around the economic analysis suitable for each rule, informed by the realities of
the data and analytic resources at its disposal, and the nature of the problem at
hand. Neither the courts, nor Congress, nor the White House are likely to
permit the SEC to wash its hands entirely of cost-benefit analysis. All should
respect, however, a good-faith effort on the part of the agency to determine as
best it can the economic effects of its rules.
The best path toward addressing these substantive questions may well be
procedural. The Commission could establish a procedure for considering
efficiency, competition and capital formation that begins at the term sheet stage
of the rule, with a formal statement of how the ECCF requirement should be
construed to be meaningful and feasible in context, and outlining what the
consideration should entail. Such a statement would accompany the term sheet
to the Chair's office. Another formal step in the rulewriting process could entail
the rulewriting team bringing the economic analysis contained in the release
before senior officials, including the Chief Economist, for sign-off before the
draft release is circulated to the commissioners. Awareness of these formal
steps on the part of the rulewriting team would sensitize policymakers to the
economics of the rule at all stages of the process. Both the proposing and
adopting releases would include a record of these steps, and courts might come
to view their job as ascertaining whether the agency's procedures are
reasonable, and whether the agency has followed them.
The Commission should resist the temptation to attempt to neuter the
ECCF provisions entirely. 228 The goal should be to create a rational, flexible
226. For an overview of the legislative history, see Cox & Baucom, supra note 12, at 1820.
227. Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2011, S. 1615, 112th Cong. (2011).
228. See BETTER MARKETS, supra note 12, at 59-68 (advocating neutering).
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boundary around the economic analysis of each rule, within which the analysis
is both feasible and meaningful. In doing so, the rule should assert that the
SEC's expertise in financial markets, market participant behavior, and financial
economics leave it, and not the courts, best situated to evaluate the competing
claims and conflicting studies at issue.
The 2012 Guidance for the first time put forth an interpretation of the
ECCF requirement as an economic one, one that deemed the statutory term
"efficiency" to refer to the economic efficiency that underlies cost-benefit
analysis. It also recognized that it is impossible to evaluate either competition
or efficiency in any economically meaningful way without considering first
what market or markets a particular rule affects.
"Competition" is well defined in antitrust law, and closely intertwined in
economic theory with notions of efficiency. The SEC may in appropriate
circumstances, evaluate the effect of its rules on competition the way the
antitrust authorities review mergers, so that any market that would be
sufficiently competitive after the rule's adoption to permit a merger under the
DOJ or FTC antitrust guidelines would be sufficiently competitive to satisfy the
SEC requirement. Such an analysis should be a sufficient answer to
commenters who presuppose that any reduction in competition should be fatal,
without regard to whether or not the market in question will remain
competitive. Some commenters, notably the Business Roundtable and its
consultants at NERA, seem to believe that the statutory term "competition"
means the same thing as "U.S. competitiveness," a distinct and often
conflicting goal, but one the Commission has never formally gainsaid.229
Finally, if "capital formation" is to be considered a statutory goal, it too
requires definition. No one is in favor of capital formation by the promoters of
Ponzi schemes. We believe capital formation is best viewed as a key aspect of
allocative efficiency. The securities laws should provide informational and
market structures that enable markets to allocate the right amount of capital to
the right investment opportunities through appropriate prices and rates of
return.
These issues are important, and Commissioners with strong opinions may
find it difficult to reach agreement about them, especially since their debates
will inevitably be informed not only by law and economics, but by
understandable concerns about the potential for unintended consequences of
these definitions to limit their own prerogatives and those of future
Commissions. The added degree of judicial deference any future Guidance
would be due if adopted by the full Commission may be relatively small. 23 0
229. See NERA REPORT, supra note 100.
230. The ECCF statutes govern agency procedures, not the actions of regulated entities or
other third parties, and no agency interpretation of them could apply to third parties any more than the
statute itself does. If Mead's limitation of Chevron deference to rules "carrying the force of law" is
limited to rules that bind third parties, then no Commission construction of the ECCF statutes can be




Since Commission consensus will not be easily won, the SEC Chairman
could choose not to seek it, increasing her flexibility. Our hope, nonetheless, is
that Commissioners with different views will find common cause in adopting a
construction of the ECCF statute as a policy statement 23  that preserves the
SEC's capacity to adopt regulations in the public interest to protect investors,
and empowers the Commission, rather than the courts, to consider economic
factors in its rulemaking procedures. Whether adopted by the full commission
or not, Guidance 2.0 should reserve to future rulemaking proceedings the
agency's right to choose the right econometric tools for the job at hand.
E. Bounded Rationality and Rational Boundaries
Economic analysis will benefit the policymaking process only if the SEC
can define and confine its scope within rational boundaries-boundaries within
which it can be expected to produce useful insights for policymakers and earn
the deference of reviewing courts. "It is evident that the rational thing to do is
to be irrational, where deliberation and estimation cost more than they are
worth." 2 32 But how do we know when that is the case? Thought and
deliberation ahead of regulatory (or any other) action are doubtless desirable,
even though any such analysis will necessarily be incomplete.
Is it possible to know when time for deliberation is to give way to action?
A second-order analysis about the value of the first may be in order, but the
regression is infinite and there is no reason to expect the series to converge.233
that administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference
when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the
force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of
that authority.") (emphasis added). Still, a well-considered Commission construction of the ECCF
statutes should at least be entitled to a degree of judicial deference under Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944) (providing that deference to an agency interpretation or opinion is a function of the
"thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control.").
231. Consistent with the discussion above, an interpretation issued as a policy statement would
not hold the force of law. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. FERC, 315 F.3d 316, 323 (D.C. Cir.
2003) ("'Policy statements' differ from substantive rules that carry the 'force of law,' because they lack
'present binding effect' on the agency." (quoting Interstate Natural Gas Ass'n v. FERC, 285 F.3d 18, 59
(D.C. Cir. 2002))); Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Am. Bus. Ass'n v.
United States, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
232. FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 67 (1921) (quoted in John Conlisk,
Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 669, 686 (1996)). Conlisk discusses in detail the infinite
regression problem that arises when economic analysis itself is costly. For an overview of bounded
rationality, see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2012); JAMES G. MARCH, A PRIMER
ON DECISION MAKING: HOW DECISIONS HAPPEN (1994); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard
Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); and Herbert
Simon, Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning, 2 ORG. SCI. 125 (1991).
233. Id. at 687. "If we can economize on economizing, we can economize on economizing on
economizing, and so on." Id.
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At some point, "a decision must be taken on intuitive grounds." 234 The SEC
itself, with its expert cadre of financial economists, is far more qualified than
generalist courts to decide whether or not a particular line of analysis is worth
pursuing. Respecting that judgment, if it is exercised reasonably (though
informed by intuition), will more effectively employ scarce government
analytical resources than will long, legislated checklists. The SEC is far more
likely to win that respect if it improves the quality of its economic analysis.
"Long-term prophecies can be derived from scientific conditional
predictions only if they apply to systems, which can be described as well-
isolated, stationary, and recurrent. These systems are very rare in nature; and
modern society is not one of them." 23 6 Economic analysis should therefore
inform, but should not be expected or allowed to dictate, policy.
V. White House Review of Independent Agency Rules?
The debate about whether independent regulatory agencies should be
made subject to OIRA began when OIRA was created and continues to this
day. 23 7 Generally unrecognized, however, is that whatever the merits of such
review may be for executive agencies headed by one Presidential appointee,
multi-member commissions as currently constituted cannot be expected to
interact productively with OIRA. SEC staff charged with that interface would
be able to speak at best for the Chairman's office, and not for the Commission
as a whole. This problem is exacerbated by Sunshine Act prohibitions on
private pre-decisional deliberations between Commissioners as a group and
staff. These structural and legal considerations make the degree of rationality
we expect from hierarchical bureaucracies an unrealistic expectation where
multi-member bi-partisan bodies are concerned.
A. Rational Politics and Quasi-Legislative Bodies
The Securities and Exchange Commission consists of five
Commissioners, no more than three of whom may belong to the same political
party. The SEC Chair is the CEO of the agency, and a Commissioner as well.238
The Chair's direct reports include the Directors of each of the SEC divisions,
which are, in turn, organized like typical federal bureaucracies, with one
234. LEIF JOHANSEN, I LECTURES ON MACROECONOMIC PLANNING: GENERAL ASPECTS 144
(1977).
235. Cf Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of2011, S. 1615, 112th Cong. (2011).
236. KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE 339 (1965).
237. For several early contributions to this debate, see supra note 20.





important difference: proposing release or adopting releases can only be
adopted by a majority vote at a public meeting of all Commissioners.23 9
The SEC Chair is powerful: the entire SEC staff reports to her. Still, the
Chair cannot always count on the vote of the other two members of her
party.24o This problem is exacerbated by the case law giving weight to
dissenting opinions, as was the case in Chamber I.241 A strong Chair can be
effective in this environment nonetheless. Yet a compromise designed to win
one vote is likely to cost another. Any Commissioner who is insufficiently
appeased reserves the right to make a statement at the Open Meeting in which
the rule is adopted, in a sentence or two-a statement that will weigh heavily
against the rule's validity if challenged in the Court of Appeals.
The notice-and-comment process for producing a rule takes many months
of staff time, including drafting the rule and its release (including the economic
analysis), reviewing and summarizing comments, and meeting with interested
parties. But for the last thirty days before adoption, the rule belongs to the
Commissioners. The staff during this period responds to questions and
comments from individual commissioners, while the Chair's office and senior
staff try to build consensus around a particular version of the rule. In short,
despite the Chair's powerful leadership role, the Commission functions in
crucial respects much like a mini-legislature, and its rules, while more focused
and coherent than many bills that pass Congress, should nonetheless be
understood as the product of logrolling compromises of the kind familiar to
students of the legislative process.242
Rules adopted by multimember commissions are the result of a quasi-
legislative process, unlike the processes of executive agencies. A bipartisan
commission may only be able to act by allowing for the possibility of last-
minute decisions, as logrolling compromises produce the final form of the rule
on the eve of the Open Meeting.243 Where do such compromises leave the
economic analysis section of the release, prepared before anyone could have
known the final outcome? Those decisions, which economic analysis should
inform but cannot determine, often resemble settlements reached on the
239. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006).
240. Witness SEC Chairman Schapiro's inability to garner the three votes necessary to reform
the capital structure and net asset value reporting rules for money market funds, which played a critical
role in the financial crisis. See Nathaniel Popper, Changes to Money Market Funds Stall, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/23/business/sec-calls-off-vote-on-fund-
regulation.html.
241. Chamber I, 412 F.3d at 144.
242. A substantial theoretical literature and empirical literature have analyzed decision making
in multimember bodies with different institutional characteristics; for an overview of some of the
seminal works, see Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice in Practice and Theory, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1657
(1991).
243. For a discussion of an analogous problem with respect to rules developed by negotiated
rulemaking, see Patricia M. Wald, Negotiation ofEnvironmental Disputes: A New Role for the Courts?,
10 COLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 1, 22 (1985) (noting that negotiated rulemaking may produce a rule that is
"pure political logrolling ... rather than rational decisionmaking").
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courthouse steps more than they resemble a judge's reasoned decision after a
trial on the merits.
While certainly subject to conflicting pressures from interest groups,
Congress, and the White House, an executive agency headed by an individual
can be expected to implement a more linear regulatory process. Executive
agencies have a chain of command, perhaps ending at Secretary, Deputy,
Assistant or Director levels, in which the buck stops somewhere within the
Cabinet department or bureau in question. In an executive agency, policy
options and decisions can flow down and up the chain in an orderly, logical
manner, with big decisions made first, informed by cost-benefit analysis. OIRA
CBA can form a constructive part of such a process.
B. Making 01RA Review Work for Independent Agencies
The Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act (IARAA), introduced
during the last Congress, would have authorized the President to subject
independent agencies, and their economic analysis of regulations, to OIRA
review. 2 " The bill attracted bipartisan sponsorship and sparked significant
debate.245 Opponents argued that the bill would interfere with agency
independence and add further delays to a rulemaking process already stalled by
excessive judicial review.246
Our observations about the structural incompatibility of OIRA review and
independent agency structure have been cited in the debate against the bill.2 47
We stress here, in addition, that the judicial review provisions in IARAA invite
devastating litigation in the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the SEC can argue
with some justification that the 2012 Guidance and the enhanced role of its
244. Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act, S. 3468, 112th Congress (2012).
245. The bill received sufficient consideration that the heads of the SEC, CFTC, Federal
Reserve Board, CFPB, NCUA, and FDIC coauthored a letter opposing the bill. See Letter from Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. Of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., et al., to Sen. Joseph Lieberman, Chair, S.
Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs & Sen. Susan Collins, Ranking Member, S.
Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Oct. 26, 2012),
http://www.buckleysandler.com/uploads/104/doc/ 0-26-12%2OAgency%2OLetter%2Oto%
20Lieberman%20re%20S%203468.pdf
246. Id. at 1 (arguing that the bill "would constitute a fundamental change in the role of
independent regulatory agencies" and "would likely result in unnecessary and unwarranted litigation in
connection with our rules"). For other critiques, see, e.g., Mark Gongloff, Senators Want To Give
President Power To Stop Insufficiently Lenient Financial Regulations, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 10, 2012, 2:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-gongloff/congress-financial-
regulations b_1871382.html (concluding that the bill "would create yet another helpful roadblock,
another tactic to delay bank reforms for months while lawyers haggle"); Rena Steinzor, The Independent
Agency Regulatory Analysis Act, as Critiqued by Co-Sponsor Susan Collins and Me, CPRBLOG
(Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cftm?idBlog=E42958C4-B61A-8FDA-
62ACBF689F7DO313 (arguing that the bill "defeats the whole point of making the agencies independent
at the outset").
247. Anti-Regulatory Bill Would Limit the SEC's Ability To Protect Investors, CENTER FOR
EFFECTIVE GoV'T (Nov. 6, 2012), http://dev.ombwatch.org/anti-regulatory-bill-would-limit-SEC-




Chief Economist in the rulemaking process have replicated at the staff level the
kind of constructive, rational, economics-based dialogue that OIRA review is
intended to foster.
We also recognize the value of economic analysis in rulemaking, and urge
policy advocates and legislators to view IARAA not only as a threat to
financial reform, but as an opportunity to fix the rulemaking process itself.
Specifically, we recommend that any such bill include (i) an exemption from
the Sunshine Act to facilitate pre-decisional deliberations at the Commissioner
level and (ii) the recognition that the OIRA process will satisfy ECCF and
similar requirements per se, creating a safe harbor from future litigation over
the economic analysis of rules. While OIRA review would entail a loss of
independence, independent agencies should be happy to discuss econometrics
with OIRA if by doing so they preclude second-guessing by the D.C. Circuit.
Given this situation, OIRA review-if coupled with the reforms we advocate-
seems like a good trade for those in favor of effective, well-informed
regulation.
1. Sunshine, Sunset
The Sunshine Act,248 like the Freedom of Information Act, 249 is intended
to foster openness and transparency in government. 250 Congress required that
important decisions be made openly, to give the public a full understanding of
the Commission's reasoning, and the compromises it made, a deeper
understanding than one based only on minutes, background papers or formal
statements.2 51
Most of the work of the SEC's rulewriting staff is exempt from FOIA
under a broad exemption for pre-decisional deliberations.252 The Sunshine Act
lacks this particular exemption because, according to the legislative history,
"[i]t is not sufficient for the purposes of open government to merely have the
public witness agency votes. The meetings opened by Section 201(a) are not
248. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006).
249. Id. § 552.
250. See C. THOMAS DIENES ET AL., NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW § 9.5(a) (2d ed. 1999).
251. See S. REP NO. 94-3 54, at 5 (1975).
252. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2006); see also DIENES ET AL., supra note 250, § 10-2(c)(6). The
exemption protects "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available
by law to a party other than the agency in litigation with the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2006). The
deliberative-process privilege (which some courts refer to as "executive privilege") is frequently
invoked under this exemption. We recommend adding this exemption to the Sunshine Act. The primary
interest protected by the deliberative process privilege is the prevention of "injury to the quality of
agency decisions." NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 (1975). Harms that the privilege
is intended to avert include: (1) the loss of straightforward, candid discussions within an agency, which
are crucial to the quality of agency decisions; (2) the deterioration of the integrity of agency decisions;
and (3) public confusion as to an agency's intentions, which would result from premature disclosure.
DIENES ET AL., supra note 250, § 10-2(c)(6) (citing Jordan v, Dep't of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 772-74
(D.C. Cir. 1978)).
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intended to be merely reruns staged for the public after the agency members
have discussed the issue in private and predetermined their views. The whole
decisionmaking process must be exposed to public scrutiny." 2 53
Public meetings of the Commission, streamed on the Web and often
covered by the media, are set pieces, in which the Commissioners and staff
read prepared remarks. Commissioners sometimes ask staff a question or two,
but never question or address one another in public. They are, in a word,
precisely what the Sunshine Act legislative history deemed insufficient. Yet
they are certainly not reruns, either, because ever since the Sunshine Act, the
important meetings the Act aimed to open to the public-the ones where the
real discussions and negotiations are had-now no longer take place at all.
Because three Commissioners are enough to pass a rule, and the Sunshine Act
prohibits any kind of private policy discussion among more than two
Commissioners, with or without the presence of rulewriting staff, the Sunshine
Act has chilled Commissioner-level policy discussions entirely. It has left
Commissioners to communicate as best they can through one-on-one meetings,
seriatim written consents, commissioners' counsel meetings and other awkward
workarounds.
This unintended consequence has been widely decried,254 and undefended
to our knowledge. Still, it is hard to persuade legislators to vote against
"sunshine." A new version of IARAA might offer a rare opportunity to fix a
bad provision in a popular statute, 25 5 by adding an exemption to permit pre-
decisional deliberations. Economic analysis is a conversation, not a calculation
or a confrontation. Conversations between the agency and OIRA could well
improve SEC rules, but five Commissioners cannot be expected talk policy
with the director of OIRA, when the Sunshine Act doesn't even let them talk
among themselves.
253. S. REP. NO. 94-354, at 18.
254. For a helpful overview, see Fisch, supra note 12, at 29-33. Criticism of the Sunshine Act
by current and former SEC employees is particularly common. See, e.g., Fixing The Watchdog:
Legislative Proposals To Improve And Enhance The Securities And Exchange Commission: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 112th Cong. 43 (statement of Stephen J. Crimmins, Former Deputy
Chief Litig. Counsel, Enforcement Div., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n) ("In 20 years as Commission
Secretary, I had the privilege of working for seven Chairmen, four acting Chairmen, and almost 20
Commissioners. Every one of them, at some point in time, expressed deep frustration with how the
Sunshine Act was preventing them from really doing their job to the best of their ability.").
255. While considering this issue, legislators might also consider loosening Paperwork
Reduction Act restrictions on information-gathering to inform rulemaking. Even the resubmitted FRRA
recognizes and attempts to address this problem. See Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2013,
S. 450 § 4, 113th Cong. (2013) ("For purposes of the Paperwork Reduction Act obtaining, causing to be
obtained, or soliciting information for purposes of complying with [the regulatory analyses required by




2. Safe Harbor from Judicial Review
Litigation is a terrible way to do economic analysis. The twenty-year
conversation between the D.C. Circuit and the SEC is evidence enough of that.
Yet IARAA included provisions inviting litigation256 (in contrast to the CBA
executive orders, 2 57 which preclude it.) The IARAA's judicial review
provisions appear to reflect an unpublished 1981 Justice Department opinion
that found its way to the Hill,258 presumably leading the drafters to believe that
the bill would preserve the status quo.259 But the law's review provisions would
transform a theoretical possibility into an invitation to litigate every rule. In
light of the current jurisprudence in the D.C. Circuit, any future bill should
affirmatively protect the integrity of the OIRA review process by creating a
true safe harbor from litigation over the economic analysis required.
Economic analysis requires sober agency considerations and assessments
of costs and uncertainties. Private litigants must not be allowed to throw these
findings back at the agency as "party admissions against interest," undermining
the validity of the very rules that the analysis informed. Agencies do not have
"interests" the way private parties do. They are formulating policy-in which
the only interest is the public interest, and the only goal is getting it right.
Agencies are supposed to provide a candid assessment of available options to
find the least bad one, and a hostile litigation environment is no place to do it.
The SEC realized in 2011 that a well-done cost-benefit analysis would
more than satisfy its statutory ECCF requirements, and began performing both
in a single section of its releases. The 2012 Guidance codified that change, and
initiated a series of procedural changes improving its economic analysis of
rules. Any future IARAA bill should acknowledge the same reality, and make it
clear that the SEC shall be deemed to have "considered" efficiency,
256. S. 3468, 112th Cong. (2012). While section 4(a) of the bill would exempt compliance
with the OIRA-agency dialogue from judicial review, section 4(b) would deem "any determination,
analysis, or explanation produced by the agency . .. pursuant to an Executive Order issued under this
Act . . . part of the whole record of agency action" in connection with judicial review, thus effectively
reversing the exemption from judicial review central to OIRA-agency dialogue under E.O. 12,866. Id. §
4(b). IARAA is thus an invitation to litigation by regulated entities, putting even more weapons at their
disposal. A more balanced and effective approach would be to reverse the import of sections 4(b) and
4(c) of the Act, and combine the cost-benefit analysis contemplated by the act with each independent
agency's existing economic requirements (ECCF, in the case of the SEC), and make the integrated
analysis subject to the exclusive review of impartial OIRA, exempting it from judicial review.
257. See sources cited supra note 21.
258. Memorandum from Larry L. Sims, Acting Ass't Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to
David Stockman, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, on Proposed Executive Order on Federal Regulation
(Feb 22, 1981) (on file with authors).
259. See Letter from Jonathan H. Adler, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve Univ. Sch.
of Law, et al., to Sen. Joseph Lieberman, Chair, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov't Affairs & Sen.
Susan Collins, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov't Affairs (Jan. 2, 2013) (arguing
that "S. 3468 would specifically bar the courts from reviewing whether OIRA and the rulemaking
agency have complied with review procedures established by the President.") (on file with authors).
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competition and capital formation for Securities Act purposes if it substantially
complies with OIRA requirements.
VI. Conclusion
The twenty-year conversation between the SEC and the court that we have
described has been mostly about financial economics. While the SEC is the
expert in the field, the conversation has been one-sided-and not just because
the judges naturally have the last word.
The SEC, and not the court, is the expert in financial economics, but
hasn't pressed its natural advantage in its long dialogue with the court. The
SEC gave up on mutual fund boards, and lost another turn to speak when it lost
authority over indexed annuities. In the following round, it could easily have
refuted the court's demonstrably false charge that it had "botched" the proxy
access-economics, but the rule's flaws made review by the full D.C. Circuit or
Supreme Court understandably unappealing. Some at the lawyer-dominated
SEC have been reluctant to admit that this story has been about economics at
all. As a result, the Court's findings, rulings and misunderstandings still stand.
The resulting pressures from Congress have led to the publication of the 2012
Guidance, and the agency's economics department has doubled in size.
Cost-benefit litigation has substantially slowed the pace of financial
reform, and new cost-benefit legislation looms. We have offered the agency
three strategies in response. First, the SEC should continue efforts to affirm its
expertise in financial economics. The agency should welcome its reinforced
corps of economists as real members of the rulewriting team, and insist on its
right, derived from that expertise, to set the boundary between economic
analysis and policy choice. Second, the SEC should re-propose a proxy access
rule that has been improved through these new procedures in order to win
favorable circuit court opinion on cost-benefit analysis. Third, if cost-benefit
measures seem likely to pass Congress, the SEC should ensure that they are
accompanied by reforms, including a safe-harbor from litigation, that will
facilitate rather than impede the rulewriting process. These efforts should lead
to economic analyses of future rules that are both meaningful and feasible, and
help reclaim the judicial deference that the Commission's decisions are due.
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